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ABSTRACT
This study examined how Egyptian newspapers framed Egyptian Islamic movements in
the two years following the January 25, 2011 revolution. A content analysis was
conducted on four newspapers including the state-owned Al-Ahram and three private
newspapers representing different levels of professionalism: Al-Masry Al-Youm, AlYoum Al-Sabea‘ and Al-Dostor. The total sample consisted of 197 front-page news
articles. Results indicated that Egyptian newspapers predominantly associated Islamism
with negative values. Among the top five frames that dominated Egyptian newspapers
coverage of Islamists – ―anti-democracy‖, ―politically organized‖, ―violence‖,
―polarization‖, and ―anti-revolution‖ – four were negative. The study found framing
differences across Islamic groups, especially between the Muslim Brotherhood and the
Salafi Al-Noor party. Negative framing was more common in private newspapers scoring
lower on professional and ethical standards. Results suggest that Islamists were already
framed negatively before they reached power, and when their political roles changed
framing became more negative. The study provides a reference point for future
comparisons with the framing of Islamic movements in Egypt following the removal of
President Mohammed Morsi on July 3, 2013.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Egyptians from all walks of life participated in the January 25, 2011 revolution
against dictator Hosni Mubarak, an event which opened the doors for greater media
freedom and free political competition. Egyptian media witnessed major changes during
the period directly following the revolution. More channels and newspapers were
established and quickly gained wide audiences, and constraints on news content
decreased in comparison with the Mubarak era. Despite the relatively open and free
media environment, the Egyptian news environment continued to be plagued by
problems, including a basic lack of professionalism (Elmasry, 2013; Schleifer, 2013;
Howaidy, 2013b). Islamists and some analysts (see Esposito, 2013; Elmasry, 2013;
Amin, 2013, Howaidy, 2013a, Al-Majid, 2012, Ibrahim, 2012) have argued that during
the one-year presidency of Muslim Brotherhood member Mohammed Morsi, private
Egyptian media outlets engaged in a fierce anti-Muslim Brotherhood campaign to
delegitimize the group (El-Amin, 2013; Elmasry, 2013; Margolis, 2013). These analysts
have argued that portrayals of the Morsi administration, the Muslim Brotherhood and
other Islamists were often based on rumor and exaggeration, and were sometimes devoid
of basic standards of professional journalistic fairness and balance (Elmasry, 2013;
Howaidy, 2011, Al-Majid, 2012). The present study used content analysis to investigate
claims that images of Islamists were distorted by mainstream Egyptian news outlets in the
two years following the January 25, 2011 revolution. How were Islamists framed in the
post-revolution Egyptian media environment? Do the Egyptian media still use Mubarakera stereotypes in covering Islamists? What power relations does the media framing of
Islamists reflect?
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Specifically, the study aimed to find out (1) which frames dominated the
representation of Islamic groups in post-revolution Egyptian newspapers, (2) whether
framing of Islamists differs across different types of newspaper ownership, and different
levels of media professionalism, (3) whether framing is consistent for different Islamic
movements, (4) whether framing differs with the political roles played by Islamists: being
in opposition, in the new parliament, or in the presidency and the government, and (5) to
what extent media framing of Islamists aligns with Mubarak regime discourse about
Islamists.
The study is important for several reasons. First, it helps inform the debate on
whether Egyptian media is biased against Islamists, a claim that is propagated by
Islamists and some observers (see Esposito, 2013; Elmasry, 2013; Kirkpatrick & ElSheikh, 2012), but denied by the mainstream Egyptian media. Second, examining the
framing of Islamists paves the way for investigating what effects such framing may have
on both non-Islamist audiences and on Islamists themselves, and for a comparison of
Egyptian and international media framing of Islamists. Third, the study helps realize how
framing can contribute to (or discourage) violence/tolerance, polarization/collaboration,
and thus influence the path of transition in Egypt.
Available literature on Islamists included very few studies on how their societies including the media, elite and audiences - perceive them (Utvik, 2011). In addition, most
studies on Islamists and the media focused on violent Islamists. Few studies dealt with
the media representation of peaceful Islamists and most of them were done on Western
media. This study contributes to literature by examining non-violent Islamists or ‗Islamic
democrats‘ as represented in the news media of a Muslim-majority country.
2

The next chapter provides a background on Islamism. It is followed by a chapter
on the situation in Egypt after the revolutions pertaining to Islamists. A brief background
on the sampled Islamic movements proceeds, followed by a chapter on framing theory as
the study‘s conceptual framework, then the research design and detailed description of
the method used. And finally the results, conclusions derived, and future
recommendations are highlighted.
Who are Islamists?
Literature on Islamists can be classified to three different trends. Authors have not
only differed in how they‘ve defined Islamism, but also and more importantly in their
recommendations on dealing with it. Some scholars writing about Islamists have been
described as ‗confrontationalists‘, and others as ‗accommodationists‘ (Mishra, 2008).
Others writing about Islamism have, themselves, come from Islamist backgrounds. The
latter group emerged from the emphasis on the need to understand Islamism within its
own context and through its own voice. Ignoring first hand resources and analyzing
Islamists isolated from their community and compared against Western problems and
standards resulted in oversimplification of the phenomenon (Utvik, 2011). Much of the
debate about Islamism might be all running within a Western orientalist approach (Martin
& Barzegar, 2010).
Terms and Definitions
The first group, the confrontationalists – or the clash of civilization school
(Mujani & Liddle, 2004) – doesn‘t stop too much at the term used for the phenomena; for
them all the terms are the same: Islamism equals fundamentalism, militant Islam, and
radical Islam. Leading confrontationalists include Bernard Lewis, Samuel Huntington,
3

Daniel Pipes, and Robert Spencer. For example, for Pipes, Islamism is characterized by
―three main features: devotion to sacred law, rejection of Western influence, turning faith
into ideology‖ (Pipes, 2003, p.7). For confrontationalists, Islamism is a ‗totalitarian
ideology‘ equated with Marxism/Leninism and fascism (Pipes, 2003). It believes that
Islam and politics are not separated, and calls for establishing an Islamic state based on
Shari‘a law, which (in this perspective) is an Islamic theological state (Skelly, 2010).
They argue that the rise of Islamic movements will lead to ―…no less than a clash of
civilizations—the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against
our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both‖
(Lewis, 1990, p. 10).
Among the second group – the accommodationists - there is still a debate on
which term is the most suitable to describe Islamic movements, and accordingly which
definition is the best to include all the varieties among Islamists (see Martin & Barzegar,
2010). Well known accomodationists include John Esposito, Noah Feldman and David
Emmerson. An ongoing debate amongst accomodationists discusses diverse definitions
and multiple terms, but all of these scholars and analysts seem to share a willingness to
accept and engage with Islamists. Bayat (2005) gathered the different terms used for
Islamism like 'Islamic fundamentalism', 'Islamic movements', 'political Islam', 'Islamic
activism', 'Islamic revivalism' or 'resurgence' (p. 893). He argued that Islamic
fundamentalism has now been replaced by other terms, the latest of which is Islamism.
‗Islamic movements‘ excludes independent Islamist thinkers and believers who don‘t
officially affiliate with the movements. ‗Political Islam‘ implies that Islam is being
politicized, is being transformed to a political ideology, thus it is refused by Islamists who
4

argue that Islam as a religion deals with all aspects of life, and also by observers who
argue that Islamic social movements were not built primarily for politics (Brown, 2013).
‗Islamic Activism‘ was proposed by Bayat (2005) to describe all ―extra-ordinary
religiosity of the Muslim population in modern times [including] active piety, as
exemplified in trends and movements which centre on individual self- enhancement
and identity‖ (p. 894), but if it is engaged mainly with politics then it is ‗Islamism‘.
Emmerson (2010) argued for using Islamism because it allows adding different
adjectives including non-violent, moderate and democratic Islamists beside violent,
illiberal or authoritarian. He amended an earlier definition of Islamists by James Piscatori
to be ―Muslims who are committed to public action to implement what they regard as an
Islamic agenda, Islamism is the commitment to, and the content of, that agenda‖ (p. 17).
Emmerson asserted that Islamism is not necessarily political, but also includes ―social,
economic, cultural and evangelical Islamists‖ (Emmerson, 2010, p.29). Unlike Bayat, he
excluded personal piety, limiting Islamism to collective and public action.
On the other hand, Variso (2010) argued against using the terms Islamism and
fundamentalism because they both imply a ―pejorative connotation‖ (p.38).
Fundamentalists and moderates are classifications derived from Western experience with
fundamental Christians, and cannot be applied to Islamic context because ―every Muslim
believes in the fundamentals of Islam‖ (Ahmed, 1999; Variso, 2010). From Variso‘s
perspective, then, using the term Islamism implies a desire to understand Islam in light of
the experience of Christianity in the West where the church and the state are separated.
This is problematic, because in this sense, if a Muslim is not secular according to the
Western standards then he/she should be an Islamist, which is not the case among
5

Muslims. Variso suggested replacing these words with adjectives for Muslims like
militants Muslims, democratic Muslims or using more neutral words like revivalism and
resurgence.
Fuller (2010) believed the problem is not in the term, but on how ‗Islamism‘ is
selectively used in the West to highlight bad Muslims. He defined Islamists as those who
believe that Islam has something to say about the political and social order of society and
who seek to implement this view in some way (Fuller, 2003, p. xi). He asserts that
Muslims do not agree on what role Islam should have in political and public life.
Armajani (2012) offered a more specific definition of Islamists as those who believe that
the truth of Quran and its legal manifestation in Shari‘a should govern the lives of
Muslims and also non-Muslims living in Muslim countries. They believe that ―Islam
should dictate every aspect of live, personal or societal‖ (p.1), that it is the true religion
and other religions are false, and that western lifestyle is antithetical to Islam.
Another set of accommodationists‘ definitions focused on the solutions proposed
by Islamists to different societal problems. Martin and Barzegar (2010) used Islamism to
refer to ―Muslim social movements and attitudes that advocate the search of more purely
Islamic solutions to the political, social and economic problems of contemporary life‖ (p.
2). Zahid and Medley (2006) defined Islamism as ―politics which promotes systems of
governance and political solutions in terms of religious doctrine rather than, say,
utilitarian considerations, or the supposed interests of classes or nations.‖ (p. 693).
An examination of the ideas of the Muslin Brotherhood, one of the biggest
Islamic movement in Egypt (see the chapter on Egyptian Islamic movements which starts
on page 18), by Rutherford (2006) led him to coin a new term: ‗Islamic constitutionalism‘
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which adopts many liberal governance ideas including constraints on state power,
government accountability, and protection of civil and political right, but differs with
liberalism in aspects like the role of law, individual role in society and state purpose.
For Islamists, Islamism is the true nature of Islam. Hassan Al-Banna, the founder
of the Muslim Brotherhood, believed Islam to be a comprehensive system that tackles
every aspect of life including law and governance, economy and culture, family and
society, besides belief and worship (Al-Banna, n.d.). Thus Islamism is:
―an intellectual, moral, societal, economic, political and inter-state movement that
is based on Islam as the main reference point and aims for a new conception of the
person, society, politics/state and thus a new model of social organization and
universal Islamic Union. In other words, it is Islam coming to life, following its
authority and ideals, with the intention of it to be established in every historical and
societal condition in the world.‖ (Bulac, 2012).
According to this perspective, every Muslim should naturally be an Islamist, and
if not, there is a problem with his or her understanding of the religion (Bulac, 2012). In
the view of Bulac, himself a Turkish Islamist, those who find difficulty in recognizing
Islamism as Islam reduce the meaning of religion to devoutness, focusing only on faith
and worship, and allowing for secularism, which is not ‗true‘ Islam (Bulac, 2012).
Based on the idea that there is no Islamism but true Islam, Islamists have rarely
used the term Islamism but instead used adjectives like Muslim and Islamic. Sayyid Qutb,
an influential Egyptian Islamist, announced the extinction of ‗the Muslim community‘
which he identified as ―a group of people whose manners, ideas and concepts, rules and
regulations, values and criteria, are all derived from the Islamic source‖ (p. 4). According
to Qutb, the (true) Muslim community ―vanished at the moment the laws of God became
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suspended on earth‖ (p. 4), and it is the role of every Muslim to revive it. A closer term
was used by the Indian Islamist Abu Al-Ala Al-Maudodi, who argued that ―It is…
inconceivable that any Muslim society worth the name can deliberately adopt a system of
life other than the Shari‘ah. If it does so, its contract is ipso facto broken and the whole
society becomes ‗un-Islamic‖ (Al-Mawdudi, n.d., p. 4)
In the Islamist‘s view, Islamism is a new word only coined to illustrate the
difference between Islamists and non-Islamist Muslims (Martin & Barzegar, 2010). Some
current Islamists and analysts prefer to use different terms to illustrate that difference like
‗Islamic democrats‘ (Rutherford, 2006; Gehad El-Haddad, Spokesperson of the Muslim
Brotherhood, personal communication, April 15, 2013) to refer to Islamists who accepted
the basic rules of democracy and got involved in democratic processes, without believing
in secularism.
Reasons for Islamism
The three groups have different interpretations for why Islamic movements
emerged. It is a reaction to modernity in the view of confrontationalists; an anti-modern
ideology that resulted from poverty (Clawson, 2010) or was a consequence of
―frustration, and a deeply bruised sense of identity‖ (Pipes, 2003, p.5). According to this
group, early roots of the phenomena can be traced to the early history of Islam, not as a
religion but in the tribal culture in which Islam emerged (Salzamn, 2010). Thus Islamism
is also a pre-modern traditional ideology adopted by poor people who were untouched by
modernity (Mujani & Liddle, 2004). In this ―modernist‖ view, Islamism is a reaction to
Western modernization, carried out by traditional people, scholars and the urban poor
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(Bayat, 2005, p. 894). Consequently, this perspective explains the ―modernity‖ of some
Islamists as the inescapable Western influence on them (Pipes, 2003).
The accommodationists view Islamism as ―the manifestation of, and a reaction to,
post-modernity… a quest for difference, cultural autonomy, alternative polity and
morality vs. the universalizing secular modernity‖ (Bayat, 2005, p. 894). Islamism in this
sense is an answer to the failure of Western modernity, to propose that Islam is the
solution for society problems which Western systems and ideas including socialism,
communism and secularism failed to solve (Martin & Barzegar, 2010). Although this
approach made clear Islamism is a new phenomenon, it doesn‘t dismiss its roots in
Islamic tradition and history which have long included groups and trends that could be
labeled today as Islamists (Martin & Barzegar, 2010). As a consequence, Islamists cannot
be defined as anti-Western because they were not only a result of colonial and postcolonial experiences. Kamali (2012) explained how many Islamists reject Westernization
while believing in modernity. There is no single modernity model. The globalization of
the phenomenon led to several paths to modernity, even in the West itself. Hence,
Westernization and modernization are not the same. Moreover, Armajani (2012)
suggested that Islamism is not post-modernity but, itself, one of the modernity ideologies
in Muslims world. As she explains, Islamists never rejected change, they only bounded it
with Shari‘ah.
Islamists also provided explanations, not for the existence of Islamism as they
believe it is the true understanding of Islam, but for the emergence of Islamic movements
in the 19th century. According to Al-Banna (n.d.) and Al-Qaradawi (2003) the main
reasons for establishing Islamic movements was that Muslims departed from the practice
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of true Islam. Three factors led to this result: autocratic rulers in Muslim states,
colonization, and the fall of the Islamic Caliphate in 1924 (Al-Qaradawi, 2003). The
Muslim Ummah (nation) was divided into states which fought against each other, Islamic
law or Shari’a was replaced by colonists with man-made laws, and the ―materialistic
ideology‖ of the Western civilization became the source of influence in Muslim lives
instead of the Islamic civilization which combined soul and matter (Al-Qaradwi, 2003).
Bulac (2012) argued that, despite its mistakes and divergence from Islam, the Ottoman
Empire embodied Islamism because ‗Islam was its founding ideology‘ and the source of
its legitimacy as the Islamic Caliphate, thus, it could have been reformed. Instead, when it
was defeated, elites seeking a meaningful order turned to the West and to Islam. In this
view, Islamism is an authentic phenomenon derived from the sources of Islam, and at the
same time a modern ideology that emerged to provide solutions for the challenges facing
Muslims today. Therefore, it should not be defined in anti-Western or anti-modern terms,
it is beyond both.
Islamism relation to Islam
One of the most problematic aspects in explaining Islamism is its relation to
Islam. Even Islamists differ in this regard, but most peaceful Islamists agree that Islam is
‗pluralistic within itself‘ (BULAÇ, 2012, p.80). Thus each Islamic movement present or
adopt a certain understanding of Islam. According to Al-Banna (n.d.), this interpretation
remains human and is separated from the sacred sources of Islam; the Qur‘an and Prophet
Mohammed sayings and deeds. Thus all possible interpretations are human attempts
subject to change and modifications and are welcomed as long as they do not contradict
the sacred sources. Islamists realize that many of their differences are due to possible
10

different interpretations of Islam. Although most of Islamists believe in this plurality,
some extreme violent groups believe that Muslims who don‘t adhere to their
interpretation of Islam are infidels, and claim this as a justification to use violence against
them (Lynch, 2010).
The confrontationalists differentiate Islamism from Islam as a religion because
Islamism aims to impose a new order (Lewsi, 1990; Pipes, 2003). But at the same time
they believe Islam as a religion need to be reformed to reconcile with democracy and
modernity (Skelly, 2010). They propose ―enlightened‖ Islam, as opposed to Islamism,
which is the result of ―Islam conflict with modernity‖ and which can save Islam from
Islamism (Skelly, 2010, p. 11).
The accommodations relate Islamism to Islam. They realize that the ideas and
practices of Islamists have been always visible in Islamic history in groups seeking to
―implement the Qur‘anic injunction of ‗Command Right and Forbid Wrong‘ (Martin &
Barzegar, 2010, p. 10).
Difference between Islamists
The clash of civilizations school believes that it is not possible to reasonably
distinguish Islamists from each other (Pipes, 2003). In their view all Islamists are a
problem, there are no moderate Islamists, and all Islamists have the same goals and only
differ in means. Islamism is terrorism and it is the enemy that should be confronted. It is a
threat to both Muslims and the world (Pipes, 2003).
Accommodationists realized that Islamists have some things in common but that
they also differ in many other respects. Bayat (2005) argued that all Islamists believe that
Islam is a part of public life, they all advocate some change in the social and political
11

order, and they use similar rhetoric and dress codes. All Islamists seek a state governed
by Shari‘ah law, but this latter is open to a lot of interpretations among Muslims (Fuller,
2010). They also disagree on the means to achieve an Islamic society (Bayat, 2005).
Islamists can then be classified according to many criteria including party or/and
movement, open or closed, pragmatic or rigid, peaceful or violent, and democratic or
authoritarian (Fuller, 2010, p.52). So when speaking of Egyptian Islamism, one would
need to specify whether violent Islamists are meant or moderate ‗reformists‘ like the
Muslim Brotherhood (Bayat, 2005; Rutherford, 2006; Lynch, 2009; ), Al-Azhar scholars,
Islamic welfare organizations like Al-Gamiyya Al-Shariya which until recently had
nothing to do with politics, or independent Islamic intellectuals (Bayat, 2005). Zahid and
Medley (2006), in their study of the Egyptian and Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood,
concluded that ―religious ideology can be taken in different directions, according to
circumstances, even among organizations that share a common root‖ (p.704). But these
variations remain poorly understood by outsiders, who do not realize that context is more
influential than ideology in the development of Islamism (Hroub, 2010). To understand
the context of current Egyptian Islamic movements, it is important to review events in
Egypt after the revolution.
Egypt after the Revolution
On January 25th 2011, Egyptians from all walks of life gathered in squares
demanding ―Freedom, Dignity, and Social Justice‖. For 18 days they stood still until
Mubarak stepped down and delivered authority to the Supreme Council of the Armed
Forces (SCAF). The post-revolution actors can be classified into three groups: the
military, the old regime, and the revolutionaries who, at least originally, included all
12

Egyptians supportive of the revolution and not affiliated with the old regime. There was
an agreement on the main steps in the transitional phase towards democracy, but actors
differed in the priorities of these steps (Awad, 2013). Just few months after Mubarak was
toppled, disagreements developed into increased polarization. Egypt was depicted as
being divided to two camps: secularists and Islamists, despite convergence and a wide
range of actors in the middle.
March 2011 Referendum
Right after Mubarak overthrow, SCAF suspended the 1971 constitution and
appointed a committee of seven members to propose constitutional amendments that
would govern the transitional period. A referendum was carried out on March 19th, 2011
on twelve amendments which proposed holding parliamentary elections, then witness the
parliament‘s election of a 100-members Constituent Assembly to write the new
constitution, followed by presidential elections. It also proposed full judicial supervision
over elections and lifted previous constraints on nomination for presidency. Supporters of
the amendments perceived it as the shortest way to get the military out of authority for the
first time in 60 years through holding elections. Opponents believed the amendments
would open the way to use the unlimited powers of the president in the 1971 constitution
although there was no reference to that in the proposed articles. Opponents also
demanded that the constitution be written before a president is elected so he cannot use
his powers to hinder the political transition. They also demanded the delay of
parliamentary elections to allow new movements and parties to build popular bases.
Most Islamists supported the amendments, along with some youth groups and secular
activists (Awad, 2013). The amendments were passed with 77% of the votes and the
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SCAF issued a constitutional declaration that included the amendments and some other
articles on SCAF‘s and government‘s authorities (ANHRI, 2012).
Clashes between the military and protestors
During the SCAF-run interim period, many demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins
were dispersed violently by the army (Maher, Eskandar, & Ali, 2013). Violent Clashes
between military police and protestors took place in July 2011, October 2011, November
2011, December 2011 and again in May 2012 and led to many deaths and injuries (Awad,
2013). The most famous incidents are the Maspero Clashes – October 9th, 2011,
Mohammed Mahmoud Clashes in November, 2011, Cabinet Headquarters Clashes in
December, 2011 and, finally, the Abasiayya clashes on May 2012. Although Islamists
participated in some protests during the SCAF period, Islamists, including the Muslim
Brotherhood, were largely absent and did not participate in most of the clashes at which
protesters were massacred. Liberal revolutionary groups accused the Muslim Brotherhood
of having abandoned the revolution, while the Brotherhood argued that participation in
protests would provide SCAF with excuses to delay handing power to civilians through
free and fair elections (Sabry, 2011).
Parliamentary Elections
Elections for the People‘s Assembly – the lower house of parliament – were held
from November 2011 to January 2012, followed by elections for the Shura Council (the
upper house of parliament). The elections were perceived to increase polarization (Awad,
2013) although most electoral coalitions included Islamic and secular parties. The
Democratic Alliance led by the Muslim Brotherhood‘s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP)
included secular parties like Al-Karama party led by presidential candidate Hamdeen
14

Sabbahi, Ghad Al-Thawra, and 9 other parties (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2011). The
Democratic Alliance won 46% of the votes in the People‘s Assembly election. The
Islamic Coalition led by the Salafi Al-Nour party, the political arm of the Salafi Call (see
chapter on Egyptian Islamic Movements which starts on page 18), included Al-Asala and
Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyy parties, and won 23% of the seats. The liberal Al-Wafd party
won 8% of the seats. The Egyptian Bloc – which included secular parties the Egyptian
Social Democratic Party, the Free Egyptians Party, and Al-Tagammu‘ Party – won 7% of
the seats (Shaaban, M., Tantawy, S., & Ali, A., 2012; Carnegie, 2012). Results of the
Shura council were similar in that Islamist parties won a majority of seats.
Constituent Assemblies
In March 2012, the two houses of parliament elected 100 members for the
Constituent Assembly reflecting the different weights of political parties in the
parliament. Secularists objected and later withdrew from the assembly, which was
dissolved in April 2012 by the Supreme Administrative Court because it included
members of parliament who should have selected members from outside parliament, not
from among themselves. A second Constituent Assembly was elected in June 2012 upon
an agreement between Islamists, non-Islamists, and the military (Elmasry, 2013). Some
parties began boycotting the assembly by the end of September 2012 (Ahram Online,
2012b), and some liberal members withdrew in late November, after most of the
constitution was written. Missing members were substituted by previously elected
alternates. The assembly finished its work amid controversy in November 2012 (Ahram
Online, 2012c).
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Presidential Election
Presidential elections took place in May 2012. After the disqualification of a
number of candidates by the Presidential Elections Committee (PEC), including Hazem
Abu Ismail and the Brotherhood‘s first choice, Khairat El-Shater, the competition rested
between six major candidates. In the first round, Mohammed Morsi of the Brotherhood
got 24.5% of the vote, Ahmed Shafiq, last Prime Minister under Mubarak and believedto-be the military candidate, received 23.7%, Hamdeen Sabbahi, a Nasserist got 22%,
AbdelMoniem Abu ElFotoh, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, received
19%, and Amr Moussa, former Foreign Minister under Mubarak, came away with 11%
(Awad, 2013). In the second round runoff between Morsi and Shafiq, polarization
sharpened between the two camps. Some non-Islamist parties and movements supported
Morsi, who ended up with a narrow victory, securing 51.7% of the votes, becoming the
first ever democratically-elected civilian President in Egypt.
Before the second round of the presidential elections, the Supreme Constitutional
Court (SCC) dissolved the People‘s Assembly in June 2012 on the basis that its election
law was unconstitutional. SCAF also issued a complementary constitutional declaration
revoking legislative powers. The rapidity of the process was surprising when compared
with previous cases (Awad, 2013). SCAF also gave themselves or 20 members of the
Constituent Assembly the right to challenge its outcome in front of the Constitutional
Court if it contradicted with the ‗goals of the revolution‘. These moves attempted to strip
the coming president from many powers and preserve a political role for SCAF after the
president was elected (Awad, 2013).
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Morsi’s Constitutional Declaration and the Referendum on the Constitution
After an attack on an Egyptian Border Post in August 2012 that led to the death of
16 soldiers, President Morsi dismissed the head of SCAF, General Hussein Tantawi, and
his deputy, appointed a new defense minister, General Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi, and canceled
the Complementary Constitutional Declaration with which SCAF held legislative
authorities (Awad, 2013). Morsi tried to restore the People‘s Assembly, but the SCC
deemed his decision unconstitutional, and consequently legislative powers remained with
him. Morsi issued a controversial constitutional declaration on November 22, 2012 with
which he made his decisions immune from judicial challenges until the pass of the
constitution, and protected both the second Constituent Assembly and the Shura Council
from being dissolved by the judiciary. He also appointed a new Prosecutor General,
Talaat Abdallah, who started re-trials of Mubarak regime figures (Al-Masry Al-Youm,
2012a). The move was opposed by many political forces and demonstrations were held in
Tahrir Square and outside the Presidential Palace. Violent clashes erupted outside the
presidential palace on December 5, 2012 between protesters who supported and opposed
the declaration, and a number of protestors were killed, most of them from the Muslim
Brotherhood (HRW, 2012; Sobhy, 2012; CNN, 2013). In addition to the presidential
palace clashes, Muslim Brotherhood offices, including its headquarters, were attacked
(Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2012c). After a national dialogue on December 8, 2012 attended by
56 political figures (Al-Shorouk, 2012), Morsi amended the declaration reinstating
judicial reviews of his decisions (Egypt Independent, 2012c). Some political groups,
including the National Salvation Front (NSF) – the main opposition bloc at the time –
boycott the national dialogue, remained dissatisfied with the changes, and continued
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protests (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2012b). The President called for another national dialogue,
but the NSF again refused to participate (Egypt Independent, 2013). At the same time, the
Constituent Assembly finished the drafting process and the referendum was held in late
December 2012. The draft constitution was approved by 64% of voters in what was
viewed as the second round of the political battle between Islamists and Secularists
(Afify, 2012). Voter turnout, however, was just 33% (Abou ElFath, Hasan &AlGhoniemy, 2012). After the referendum, the opposition organized several demonstrations
against Morsi, which were characterized by increased violence, not only between police
and protestors, but also between Morsi supporters and opponents (Egypt Independent,
2013).
Egyptian Islamic Movements
The Egyptian political scene after the revolution witnessed a dramatic increase in
the number of political parties and movements, and several Islamist-oriented parties
emerged. Islamic parties and movements in Egypt can be classified along a spectrum
from conservatives to relatively liberal. The most prominent conservative parties are AlBinaa‘-w-Al-Tanmia (the Construction and Development) party of Al-Gama‘a AlIslamiyya and Al-Salam-w-Al-Tanmia (The Peace and Development) party of Al-Jihad
organization. Both were previously militant organizations and abandoned violence in the
1990s (Brown, 2013). Also among the conservatives are the Salafi parties Al-Nour (The
light), Al-Asala (the Authenticity), and Al-Fadelia (The Virtue) (Shehata, 2012) in
addition to the recent Al-Watan (The Homeland) established by former Al-Nour
members. The newest in the Islamists spectrum is Al-Raya (The Flag) party established
by former presidential candidate Hazem Abu Ismail who is also the leader of The Ummah
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Alliance which comprises other small Islamic parties (AbdelKader, 2013). The Muslim
Brotherhood can be described as ‗centrist‘ in the Islamic political spectrum (Lynch, 2010,
p. 469). Al-Wasat (The Center) and Misr Al-Qawiya (The Strong Egypt) parties are
established by former Brotherhood members and are classified as liberal Islamists (Awad
2013). Al-Hadara (The Civilization) party recently merged with Al-Wasat (Hasan, 2013).
This study will focus on the framing of Islamic parties and groups in general and of the
Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi Call in particular.
The Muslim Brotherhood
The Muslim Brotherhood is a general reform movement with a comprehensive
vision that includes political, social, economic, cultural, charitable and educational
aspects (Brown, 2013). The Muslim Brotherhood is an internally diverse and moderate
‗centrist‘ movement (Lynch, 2010). To the MB, Islam is a comprehensive way of life,
with politics as part of it. For the MB, a Muslim isn‘t a devout Muslim unless he is
engaged in politics and cares for his country, the Muslim Ummah and humanity
(Helbawy, 2010). The Muslim Brotherhood believe in gradual reform (Lynch, 2010; AlAnani & Malik, 2013). They practice daw’a, or preaching, to achieve seven goals; to
reform the self (or the Muslim individual), build the Muslim family, guide the society
towards Islam, liberate homeland from foreign occupation, reform the government to
become an Islamic government ―performing as a servant to the nation [and] in the interest
of the people‖, restoring ―the international prominence of the Muslim Ummah‖, and
finally guiding humanity through spreading Islam‘s call worldwide (Al-Banna, n.d.).
The Brotherhood is usually described as the biggest Islamic movement, with likeminded organizations in seventy countries (Al-Qaradawi, 2003; Lynch, 2010).
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According to Lynch (2010), the Global Muslim Brotherhood ―exists only notionally‖ (p.
468). The MB is known for its well-organized structure (Brown, 2013, p.2).
Hassan Al-Banna established the MB in 1928 as an ‗Islamic nationalist
movement‘ (Harris, 1964). Egypt at the time was amid a national struggle for
independence from the British colonization, and was searching for solutions for to its
social and economic problems (Harris, 1964). Westernization was taking place only in
values and morals not in sciences, education or administration. Islamic law Shari’a was
replaced by colonists with man-made laws. The Islamic Caliphate was disintegrated to
small states fighting each others, while Palestine was promised for the Jews (Helbawy,
2010).
The MB was constrained in Egypt under the monarchy, the British occupation,
Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak (Zahid & Medley, 2006). In times of relief they gained
conditional licensing, but each time they were close to power they were harshly repressed
(Awad, 2013).
The Brotherhood got involved in politics as early as 1941. To Al-Banna, political
participation was part of practicing Islam (Al-Banna, n.d.). When Al-Banna attempted to
run for elections in 1942, he withdrew due to threats by the then-Prime Minister to
dissolve the Brotherhood. In 1945, the Brothers ran but didn‘t win, with widespread
claims that the government rigged elections (Zahid & Medley, 2006).
The Muslim Brotherhood‘s popularity in the 1940s was due to their involvement
in national liberation, fighting against the British occupation in Egypt, and in Palestine in
1948. As a result, the Egyptian government, encouraged by the British, began a
crackdown on the MB, arresting them and canceling their newspaper license. A judge
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involved in the sentences against MB was assassinated. Al-Banna condemned the act and
announced the assassins were ‗nor brothers, nor Muslims‘ (Helbawi, 2010), but some
critics of the Brotherhood have continued to blame the group for the assassination. Prime
Minister Al-Nuqrashi issued a military order in December 1948 banning the MB and
confiscating all its properties. Members were fired from their jobs and arrested (Helbawy,
2010). Only al-Banna was left free to be assassinated in 1949 (Al-Qaradawi, 2003).
The MB supported the 1952 Free Officers revolution in Egypt (Lynch, 2010), and
Gamal Abdel-Nasser – the later president of Egypt – was claimed to be one of several
MB members among the Free Officers (Helbawy, 2010). Later, disagreements between
the MB and Nasser turned into major repression against the movement, which was forced
to go underground (Lynch, 2010). By 1953, almost all movement members were detained
in military prisons. After a short period of democratic resolutions in March 1954, Nasser
returned to a more dictatorial style of governance. A failed attempt to assassinate Nasser
in Alexandria in 1954 led to another major crackdown on the MB, despite the fact the
Brotherhood denied any association with the assassin. Six MB members received death
sentences from a military court and were executed (Helbawy, 2010). The MB was the
target of a similar wave of repression in 1965, when thousands of male and female
members were arrested. Seven leaders, including the famous intellectual Sayyid Qutb,
were given death sentences by a military court and executed, while others received life
imprisonment. Many members were tortured in military prisons without trails (Zahid &
Medley, 2006).
In 1970, Nasser died and Sadat took over and introduced some political reforms
permitting political parties and releasing some Brotherhood members. The following five
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years witnessed an increase in the popularity of what was called Al-Jama‘a Islamiyya
(The Islamic Group) among university students (Kepel, 2002). This overarching Islamic
movement divided later into three groups; the first group joined the Brotherhood, the
second group established the Salafi Call in Alexandria, and the third group developed
what is known as Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya and the Al-Jihad organization, which later got
involved in political violence (Kepel, 2002; Helbawy, 2010). After the Camp David
Accord, Sadat faced opposition with repression. He arrested Egyptians from all walks of
life, including members of the MB. He was assassinated in 1981 by members of the AlJihad organization.
Through the 1980s and early 1990s under Mubarak rule, the new generation that
joined the Muslim Brotherhood managed to win the elections of almost all professional
syndicates and university student unions (Rutherford, 2006; Kepel, 2002). The MB
fought against corruption and enhanced management (Zahid & Medley, 2006). By the
mid 1990s, the Brotherhood began defining their political positions on several issues
including women and minorities rights, and political competition. Rutherford (2006)
argued that they developed ―a moderate and conciliatory political agenda, however, the
regime was not in the mood to listen‖ (p. 720). Bamyeh (2013) argued that the
Brotherhood clearly adopted the principles of the civil state. However, the regime reacted
by restraining student unions and professional syndicates through legislations
(Rutherford, 2006). In 1995, Mubarak began another crackdown on the MB (Kepel,
2002). Many Brothers were sentenced by military courts in 1995, 2000, 2001 and 2007.
In total, around 50 thousand Brotherhood members were arrested during the Mubarak era
(Ahram, 2013).
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At the beginning of 2000s, leaders who were jailed in 1995 were released
(Rutherford, 2006). A new General Guide for the Brotherhood was elected in 2004. In
2005 the regime allowed a relatively free election. For the first time the Brotherhood
campaigned with its own name. They also published a reform initiative and a campaign
platform (Rutherford, 2006). The Brotherhood participated with Kifaya and other
political groups in the protests against Mubarak policies (AbdelMoniem, 2011) which
intensified after 2005.
From 1980 to 2010, The Muslim Brotherhood ran for elections. They entered
political coalitions with the liberal Al-Wafd party in 1984, and Al-‗Amal and Al-Ahrar
parties in 1987 when their alliance won 56 seats (Sarhan, 2005). The Brothers ran as
independent in 1995, 2000, 2005 (in 1990 they boycott the elections) (Helbawy, 2010). In
2005, they gained 88 from the 444 people‘s assembly seats, despite election fraud (Zahid
& Medley, 2006). In the last elections before the revolution in 2010, the NDP is widely
believed to have rigged elections (AP, 2010) and prevented almost all opposition groups,
including the MB, from entering parliament. This was considered as one of the main
causes that led to January 25th revolution (Al-Khodairy, 2013).
The Muslim Brotherhood are criticized by some analysts and scholars for their
reported lack of clarity on critical issues like ―Sharia law, religious identity, universal
citizenship,… women‘s rights‖ and minorities‘ rights (Hamzawy, Ottoway & Brown,
2007; Rashwan, 2013). They are also accused of the lack of self-criticism (Rashwan,
2013) and for allegedly considering themselves as the sole representatives of Islam
(Hasan, 2013). They have been blamed for seeking to preserve their organization more
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than anything else (Hasan, 2013), but other scholars, including Emad Shahin (2012),
attributed this concern over survival to the oppression the Brotherhood faced.
In the two years following the Egyptian revolution, the movement became
increasingly politicized (Brown, 2013). Other brotherhood activities – such as charitable
work – still exist but are less noticeable. According to the Brotherhood themselves, they
were ―changing from being an introvert organization locked into survival mode, to an
extrovert organization that is leading the new Egypt‖ (Marroushi, 2012).
Egyptian successive regimes have always used the media to distort the Muslim
Brotherhood (Kepel, 2002; Lynch, 2009; Helbawy, 2010; Brown, 2013). Their
accusations ranged from backing extremism and terrorism to treason and conspiracy with
foreign countries. The media under Mubarak often covered the Brotherhood in security
news on arrests and extremism (Rayman, 2013). Moreover, State-media framed the
Egyptian revolution as a conspiracy designed by the Muslim Brotherhood and other
external powers (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012). Furthermore and despite the fact the Egyptian
media were freer after the revolution compared to any time in Egypt‘s modern history,
arguments of continuous media bias against the MB were increasing (Al-Majid, 2012;
Esposito, 2013; Elmasry, 2013; Amin, 2013; Howaidy, 2013a; El-Amin, 2013; Margolis,
2013).
The Salafi Call
The word “Salafi” may refer to two things: first, from the Arabic word Al-Salaf
Al-Saleh the ‗pious forefathers‘ to refer to the understating of Islam through the practice
of the first three generations in Islam (Lacroix, 2012), in this sense most of the Sunni
Muslims are Salafi. Second, Salaﬁsm is a conservative Islamic global trend characterized
24

by literal understanding of Islam, emphasis on creed, and strict practice. It comprise
many Islamic movement, and can be classified to three major currents: the quietist current
that practice da‘wa only, the political current that use political means to push its reform
agenda, and the violent current that believes in the use of force as a mean of reform,
sometimes even against Muslims (Meijer, 2010).
The Salaifs became popular in Egypt in the 1990s when Mubarak was fighting
against violent Islamists and harshly oppressing the Brothers. Salafis charitable networks
flourished throughout Egypt, especially in the poor areas (Al-Anani & Malik, 2013).
Most of the Egyptian Salafis were quietist before the revolution, believing in the
complete obedience to the ruler, delegitimizing partisanship, and criticizing other Islamic
groups for engaging in politics (Al-Anani & Malik, 2013). But many turned to political
participation afterwards.
Al-Da‘wa Al-Salafiyya (The Salafi Call) is the most politically influential group
among Salafis, and the founder of Al-Noor party which came next in the People‘s
Assembly elections after the Brotherhood. The Salafi call was established in 1970s by a
group of university students in Alexandria who split from the then non-violent Al-Jam‘a
Al-Islamiyya. The reason was ideological differences. (Al-Anani & Malik, 2013).
According to Lynch (2010), the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis believe in
the comprehensiveness of Islam, want the state to be governed by Shari‘a and share a
desire to reform society according to Islam (p. 470). On the other hand, Brown (2013)
illustrated three differences between the Salafis and the Brotherhood. First, Salafis lean
more to literal interpretations of Shari‘a texts. Unlike the Brotherhood who thinks that
many possible interpretations to the texts are correct, the Salafis seek the one correct
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interpretation (Brown, 2013). Second, Salafis are less engaged with the wider society
unlike the Brotherhood who long before the revolution sought to run for election in
professional syndicates and universities in addition to parliament. Salafis believed in
change through preaching and leading by model, they are ―more of a society apart‖
(Brown, 2013, p.4). Third, Salafis lack the organizational structure and discipline that the
Brotherhood have. They are unstructured groups of followers of certain clerics. Thus
many predict that the internal feuds among them will result in more fragmentation within
Salafi parties (Brown, 2013; Al-Anani & Malik, 2013). The case of Al-Watan party
which split from Al-Nour is a recent example. Unlike the Brotherhood, Salafis are not
that familiar with long-term gradual change, they lack a clear setting of priorities and
decision on compromise (Brown, 2013).
Before the revolution Salafis were not interested in politics. Some of their clerics
prohibited participation in politics under a ―secular‖ regime that is based on man-law not
God law. Others prohibited opposition to - and of course revolution against - the ruler as
long as he is namely a Muslim (Brown, 2013; Al-Anani & Malik, 2013). Salafi also said
they refrained from political participation due to repression under Mubarak regime.
Although some Salafi leaders were hesitant in joining the revolution, but many Salafi
youth were among the demonstrators in Tahrir square (Bohn, 2011).
After the revolution, the Salafis quickly gained electoral success. They first
participated in the political process in March 2011, when they supported the
constitutional amendments which they saw as a way to protect the second article in the
Egyptian constitution which states Islamic law principles are the main source of
legislation (Brown, 2013). They later on formed three political parties, Al-Nour, Al-Asala
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and Al-Fadila. Lately a group of Salafis left Al-Nour to Establish Al-Watan party. Before
the Parliamentary elections, Al-Nour and Al-Asala joined the Democratic Alliance, an
electoral coalition led by the Muslim Brotherhood, but they later left the coalition after
disagreements with the Brotherhood on the distribution of list-seats. They later on formed
the Islamic Coalition with Al-Banaa w Al-Tanmiya party of Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamyya. The
coalition won 127 seats in the People‘s Assembly, of them 111 went to Al-Nour (Lacroix,
2012).
Attempts to explain Salafis popularity indicated three factors. First, the Salafi
satellite channels which began in 2006 and included around 10 Salafi channels (Field &
Hamam, 2009). Before the revolution, most of these channels focused on religious
preaching. Afterwards they began discussing politics and introduced daily talk-shows.
Second, Salafi charitable organizations like Al-Game‘yya Al-Shari‘yya (Sharia-Based
Society) and Ansar Al-Sunna Al-Muhammadeyya (Advocates of the Prophet
Muhammad‘s Path and Teachings) have a nation-wide network with around 5000 and
200 local branches respectively. Both provide educational and medical assistance along
with religious preaching. Although both organizations are apolitical, Al-Noor party
depended on their local branches to select candidates that ran on his lists in the
parliamentary elections (Tadros, 2012).
Despite what they share, Salafi parties differ in many positions. Al-Nour is
considered the most pragmatic among them (Al-Anani & Malik, 2013). Al-Nour
supported Abdelmoniem Abu ElFotouh, the former brotherhood member, in the first
round of the presidential elections, then President Morsi in the second round, while most
of the Salafi groups supported President Morsi from the beginning especially after the
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disqualification of Hazem Salah Abu Ismail (Brown, 2013).. A rift between Al-Nour and
the Brotherhood began in February 2012 when Al-Nour leader who worked as an Advisor
to the President on Environmental Affairs was dismissed from his position (AlDakhakhny, 2013). Al-Nour gradually moved to opposition seats since then.
Egyptian Press
The relationship between the press and the government in Egypt was always
ambivalent: ranging from press freedom to strict government control (Khamis, 2011)
Under the Ottoman rule and the British occupation, Egypt had a vibrant, diverse, strong
print media (Khamis, 2011). After 1952 revolution, Abdel-Nasser nationalized the press,
limiting its diversity and competency. Sadat came afterwards and allowed some party
newspapers. Mubarak introduced some media privatization, but it was not until after
January 25th revolution that Egyptian media changed dramatically (Khamis, 2011).
Before the revolution, Mubarak regime used a variety of tools to maintain control
over the political expression in the media (Elmasry 2012). Although the Egyptian
constitution in his era provided the basics for press freedom, legislations opened the door
for severe constraints (ANHRI, 2008). The 1996 press law and its 2006 amendments
maintained journalists imprisonment in several occasions and dozens of them received
prison sentences for violating it (Elmasry, 2011). It also preserved government control
over press licensing with unlimited authorities to revoke permits (ANHRI, 2008). In
Mubarak thirty years of rule, Egypt lived under a state of emergency. The emergency law
was used occasionally to ban publications and arrest journalists (Elmasry, 2011).
Egyptian journalists also suffered from abuse, harassment, and intimidation.
Many obstacles stood in the way of gathering verified information due to government
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monopoly over information sources and suspicion towards party and private newspapers
(Elmasry, 2011). Some subjects were beyond coverage like the President and his family,
armed forces and security bodies, besides cultural taboos (Elmasry, 2011). Journalists
practiced self-censorships to avoid legal punishment and to please the owners and
advertisers of their publications (Cooper, 2008; Peterson, 2011).
Three forms of newspaper ownership existed: State-owned newspapers, party
newspapers, and private newspapers. Opposition parties‘ organs were not popular papers.
They received government subsidies (Elmasry, 2011; Khamis 2011). It was not until 2004
that Al-Masry Al-Youm a private daily was licensed in Egypt after approximately 50
years of absence of private press (Cooper, 2008). But private media publishers had to
have clearance from security bodies in order to be granted a license (Peterson, 2011).
Thus ownership remained in the hands of Mubarak-friendly business men. However, the
introduction of private media - both print and broadcast - along with the advancement and
spread of information technology including satellite, internet, social media and mobile
media lightened government control over the media and enabled the press to began
crossing some red lines (Khamis, 2011; Iskandar, 2012).
Under Mubarak, disparities between the state-run and private newspapers reached
a level as if they were talking about different realities. In Cooper study (2008) Al-Masry
Al-Youm focused mainly on domestic politics, corruption and human rights news, and
relied less on official sources than Al-Ahram. However, President news were given the
first priority in both newspapers as part of ―the one-man show‖ that characterized
Egyptian media from 1952 to 2011 (Khamis, 2011; Peterson, 2011).
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Elmasry (2011) classified the Egyptian press system under Mubarak as a
‗polarized pluralistic‘ press model characterized by medium state intervention through
ownership and legislations, mixed types of ownership, low professional standards and
low corporatization (referring to the commercialization of the press), in addition to a
pseudo-Islamic cultural orientation (Elmasry, 2011). Khamis (2011) added neglect of
grassroots media and top-to-bottom media policy.
The media landscape after the January 25th revolution looked like how it was
before 1952 revolution in terms of the variety and the dynamism of the media scene.
Private media flourished with the launch of more than a dozen private satellite channels.
More Egyptian dailies were published either by parties or private companies. Egypt
ranking on press freedom indexes improved (Freedom House, 2013). But the transitional
period was marred with some hallmarks.
State media suffered from a ‗credibility crisis‘ because the discrepancy between
the way they covered the revolution and how events were reported on transitional
satellites and online media. This lack of credibility was the main reason for the
abolishment of the Ministry of Information in the new constitution (Khamis, 2011).
Under SCAF and despite their early promise to abolish the Ministry of
Information right after the revolution, the ministry was revived and later on a General
was appointed as the Minister (Nasser, 2013). The SCAF also appointed new heads to the
state-owned newspapers, but this did not change the way they used to work before the
revolution (Peterson, 2011). Many in the state media complained from ongoing
restrictions in editorial policies (Walker & Orttung, 2012). In some extreme cases, at least
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five state TV or radio presenters were taken off air or faced prosecution for being critical
of the military (Walker & Orttung, 2012).
There was also chaos in private media. Journalists and presenters who were antirevolution were reintroduced (Nasser, 2013; Walker & Orttung, 2012). Self-censorship
was still practiced. The editor of El-Masry Al-Youm prevented the second issue of its
English edition from publishing for what he deemed unacceptable criticism of the SCAF
(Freedom House, 2013).
Furthermore, SCAF directly warned journalists from publishing news critical to
the military (Freedom House, 2011). Many activists and journalists who criticized the
military were trialed before military courts (Reporters without Borders - RSF, 2011). A
blogger was sentenced to three years in prison for insulting the military (Khamis, 2011).
In addition, fifteen cases of attacks and detention of journalists were documented by the
end of 2011 (Freedom House, 2013). Despite this, media criticism of SCAF and the
government increased (Hamdy, 2013).
Social media, on the other hand, expanded its role in post-revolution Egypt. Many
state institutions and public figures used social media as their primary mean to reach the
public providing another source of information albeit easily and frequently falsified
(Peterson, 2011; Khamis, 2011).
Under President Morsi, lawsuits against journalists reached their highest level.
But the President banned pre-trial detention of journalists in media offences, just after a
court ordered the pre-detention of the editor of daily Al-Dostor on charges of publishing
false information and insulting the president (RSF, 2012). The editor was released on the
same day of the president‘s decision. A second print of one of Al-Dostor issues was
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confiscated by a court rule in August 2012 following lawsuits accusing it of inciting
sectarian strife (Ali, 2012). Also the controversial TV channel Al-Faraeen owned by
Tawfik Okasha was suspended for 45 days after being accused of defaming and inciting
to kill the president (Egypt Independent, 2012b). The presidency later withdrew all its
legal complaints against journalists whom it accused of defamation (CPJ, 2013; Amin,
2013). But there were other complaints filed by citizens accusing journalists of insulting
the president (Ahram Online, 2013). Lawsuits against journalists also came from judges
who filed 1,164 complaints accusing journalists and TV hosts of insulting judiciary
(Doss, 2012). In addition, a journalist was shot in the head, (possibly by a sniper), while
covering the presidential palace clashes in December 2012, and the attack went
unpunished (Berger, 2013). Several others, including two from the FJP newspaper, were
wounded in Al-Mokattam clashes in March, 2013 (Taha, 2013).
The Shura Council, the owner of state newspapers according to the law at that
time, changed the leadership of state-owned newspapers. President Morsi appointed a
new information minister from the Brotherhood. Despite reported complaints from
interference in editorial policies, and the ‗Brotherhoodization‘ of the media (Khairy,
2012), which allegedly caused two state-TV presenters to object on air (Amin 2013),
there has been reports that state media changed to an extent from acting as the mouth
piece of the ruling party (Kirkpatrick & El-Sheikh, 2012) which was interpreted as a
failure of the Brotherhood control the state media as their predecessors did (AP, July 12,
2013).
The Egyptian constitution of 2012 abolished many of the previous constraints on
the freedom of the press (The Egyptian constitution, 2012), but it was criticized for
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lacking practical mechanisms to carry its stated principle and of ―vaguely-worded
provisions‖ (Doss, 2012; RSF, 2013). The constitution guaranteed the freedom of
information and the right to access public information. It banned state censorship on
media except in a limited form in times of war. It prohibited the closure or confiscation of
media outlets except with a court order. Newspapers are no longer licensed via permits
but established through notification. The constitution also created two independent
regulatory bodies, one to supervise state-owned media and the other for the regulation of
private media, however it did not state the composition of the two bodies (Doss, 2012).
Some prominent private media took anti-Morsi and Brotherhood positions (AlMajid, 2012; Esposito, 2013; Elmasry, 2013; Amin, 2013; Howaidy, 2013a; El-Amin,
2013; Margolis, 2013), while others remained neutral in their coverage. According to the
Index on Censorship, ―most‖ private media ―routinely [vilified] President Mohamed
Morsi and his ruling Muslim Brotherhood‖ while glorifying the army as the ―guardians of
the revolution‖ (Amin, 2013).
The Egyptian Journalists Syndicate, which was once the main fighter for press
freedom under Mubarak, became a place for political battles after the revolution (Berger,
2013). Egyptian press is badly affected by the lack of self-regulation and the absence of
effective professional ethics (El-Nawawy, 2013).
Although some journalists and media experts believe that Egyptian media were
greatly constrained under Morsi (see Abdulla, 2013), but studies on newspapers content
revealed that many previous red lines on press coverage no longer existed (Rayman,
2013).
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II.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Framing Muslims
Despite the post-September 11 surge in media studies examining coverage of
Islam and Muslims, very few studies have gone deeper to analyze media representations
of Islamists. Most of the studies examining Islam and Muslims reveal that Orientalist
discourse and ‗clash of civilizations‘ (Huntington, 1993) assumptions prevail, where
Muslims are framed as violent, anti-modern, untrustworthy ‗Others‘ (Mahony, 2010,
Ibrahim, 2010; Meer, Dwyer, & Modood, 2010; Powell, 2011; Kabir & Bourk, 2012;
Shaw, 2012; Halse, 2012, Rane & Hersi, 2012). The few studies that analyzed the
representation of Islamists in media and cultural products found strong similarities
between how media in Muslim countries framed Islamists and Western media
representations of Muslims (Armbrust, 2002; Allagui & Najjar, 2011; Khatib, 2006)
including frames used (or silenced), reasons given, and solutions offered; which suggests
a similar potential effect on policy, public attitudes, and Islamists themselves.
Dominant themes in media coverage of Islam and Muslims since September 11
have been terrorism and violence, with media reports referring to Muslims as dangerous
potential terrorists and Islam as a security threat (Mahony, 2010; Shaw, 2012; Rane &
Hersi, 2012). Research found that Islam was portrayed as ‗inherently violent‘ and
Muslims as violence-oriented (Kumar, 2010, p. 254). Studies have also found that Islam
and Muslims have been closely associated with terrorism news in general (Powell, 2011;
Kabir & Bourk, 2012). Powell (2011) developed a model for US media coverage of
terrorist events where frames differed depending on the religion of the terrorist. If he is a
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Muslim, he is linked with international terrorism, identified as part of the ‗War of Islam
on America‘ (Powel, 2011, p. 105), and fear of possible future attacks is emphasized. If
he is a non-Muslim US citizen, he is humanized by searching for excuses and
investigating the context, while downgrading possible future attacks of the same kind.
Halse (2012) found similarities between US news media representation of terrorists and
the representation of Muslims in the television serial 24. The serial depicted the
stereotype of the ‗barbaric‘ Muslim: A militant aggressive fundamental Muslim who shall
be rewarded heaven for killing (Halse, 2012, p. 10). Moreover, all Muslim characters in
the TV serial were violent.
In terrorism/violence frames, the acts of a small minority of extremists are taken
as representative of all Muslims, to assert that there is not but one kind of Muslim – a
terrorist (Rane and Hersi, 2012; Kumar, 2010). Media have ignored the diversity among
Muslims and presented extreme religious interpretations of Islam as if they were Islam
itself.
A prevailing theme in media coverage of Islam and Muslims was the portrayal of
Muslims, as anti-modern and undemocratic. Research on Australian press found that the
integration of Muslims in society is measured with cultural indicators: specifically their
adherence to Western ―democratic‖ values and freedoms, and use of English language,
not by political, economic, social indicators (Rane and Hersi, 2012). In the television
serial 24, Muslims were considered to be deceivingly modern if they adopted modern
outlook and lifestyle, but with the same ―Islamic‖ mindset (Halse, 2012).
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Sexism and victimization of Muslim women were also prominent in portrayals of
Muslims in the press (Rane & Heris, 2012). Islam was represented as a religion where
Muslim women are victims of God and man‘s oppression (Kumar, 2010).
Diversity and change in framing Muslims
Most studies found little or no counter frames in media representation of Islam
and Muslims whether in news or entertainment. When frames are not challenged, their
perceived dominance increases and they become ‗taken-for-granted‘ (Kumar, 2010).
Framing was mostly negative but some studies highlighted progress towards positive
framing. Rane and Hersi (2012) found some positive representation of Muslims in the
Australian press within the frame of multiculturalism. Mahony (2010) found ‗a small
minority‘ of Australian news articles to achieve balance through providing contextual
background that challenged stereotypical presentation (p. 754). Narayana and Kapur
(2011) revealed that despite the prevailing stereotypical framing of Muslims in Indian
English newspapers, news slanting was more favorable than unfavorable following
Gujarat riots in which Muslims were killed.
In some cases, however, news media did portray differences among Muslim
communities, although this was limited to local Muslims and tended to ―[highlight]
opposing ends of a liberal/progressive versus conservative/traditional axis‖ to provide the
―point/counter point views‖ (Sharify-Funk, 2009, p. 73). By doing this, Canadian
newspapers helped in developing the debate within the Muslim community, but at the
same time it increased polarization among Muslims (Sharify-Funk, 2009). The British
press moved forward from this dichotomy to realize the diversity among Muslims. Meer,
Dwyer, and Modood (2010) found that a year after the London attacks there was progress
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in the coverage of Muslims from the racial stereotypes indicated by previous studies.
Through recognizing that there are many Muslim voices, the British press overcame the
fundamentalist-moderate dichotomy to a variety of ―angry‖, ―ambivalent,‖ and
―approving‖ voices in the Muslim community (Meer, Dwyer, & Modood, 2010, p. 229).
A certain frame is also not fixed, it develops. Halse found a slight change in the
anti-modern stereotype in his study on the television serial 24 to what he called ‗relocalization of stereotypes‘ (Halse, 2012, p. 16). He referred to a new tendency to depict
Muslims as modern in their outlook and lifestyle, but still traditional and extremist in
their minds. In other words, Muslims behave as ordinary Americans outside, but still
think as terrorists.
Representation and frames change for many reasons. First, framing change with
events; frames were mostly negative in Australian press after attacks by Muslims (Rane
& Hersi, 2012) while in the Indian English press they were positive only right after
attacks against Muslims (Narayana & Kapur, 2012). Second, framing might differ across
different types of newspapers coverage. Kabir and Bourk (2012) found differences
between hard news and editorials in New Zealand newspapers‘ coverage of Islam;
editorials were more likely to offer alternative frames within the liberal pluralistic point
of view that counter negative stereotypes. Shaw (2012) found the opposite in the British
press: right-wing hardliners discourse prevailed.
Third, frames were also found to change when covering domestic and outside
Islam; some studies found that terrorism was mainly asserted in covering external Islam
but it was not necessarily the same with internal Muslim, others found the opposite.
Analyzing US networks news right after 9/11, Ibrahim (2010) found that framing of
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Muslims differed depending on whether they were US citizens or not. She found that a
peace frame prevailed in relation to American Muslims, while violence and threat were
emphasized only in covering Muslims outside the US. Kabir and Bourk (2012) found
that Islam and Muslims were mostly covered in international news related to terrorism in
New Zealand newspapers, while local Muslims received insignificant coverage. In these
studies, violent Islamists were depicted as external aliens. However, the opposite was also
found. In the Australian press, Rane and Hersi (2012) found that after the London
Bombings in 2005 ―the dominant frame… shift[ed] from international jihadists towards
the threat posed by home-grown Muslims not integrating into society‘ (p.143). The same
was reported as a change in the stereotypical terrorist in Halse‘s analysis of 24. There, it
was emphasized that the Muslim enemy is now among us and can be next door (Halse,
2012).
Fourth and most importantly, frames change with political discourse (Ibrahim,
2010; Powell, 2011; Rane & Hersi, 2012). Studies found that the prevailing frames in US
news media right after 9/11 attacks was positive and inclusive when covering American
Muslims. This was a result of the discourse of White House right after the attacks which
asserted that Islam is the religion of peace, and that the war on terror was not a war on
Islam. But with external Islam the media adopted the government discourse of ‗us‘ vs.
‗them‘. Moreover, political discourse was found to be the reason behind the prominence
of issues related to Muslims in the Australian press (Rane & Hersi, 2012). This should
not come as a surprise, media adoption of government discourse is due to its dependence
on public officials as their primary sources (Powell, 2011). This also made framing
global. Kabir and Bourk (2012) found in their study of New Zealand newspapers that as
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local media relied on international news agencies in covering international news
concerning Islam and Muslims, thus dominant frames were locally adopted.
Reasons and consequences of Muslims framing
The common explanation behind the stereotypical representation of Muslims in
the media is the Orientalist discourse and the clash of civilization theory (Mahony, 2010,
Ibrahim, 2010; Meer, Dwyer, & Modood, 2010; Shaw, 2012; Kabir & Bourk, 2012).
Powell (2011) concluded that US news media after 9/11 emphasized the oriental
discourse of ‗us‘ vs. ‗them‘; evil Muslim/Arab/Islam vs. Good Christian America.
Stereotypical representations in television serial 24 compared ‗the Orient (irrational,
undeveloped, inferior) [to].. the West (rational, developed, superior)‘ (Halse, 2012, p.
14). Moreover, overwhelming ‗pejorative‘ framing was not questioned nor challenged;
whenever Muslims were the subject of news, the focus was solely on their religion and it
was the determinant of their ‗Otherness‘ (Rane & Hersi, 2012, p. 144).
Five frames were detected in Kumar analysis of speeches and comments of the
western ‗primary definers of news‘: those whom their framing of the problem ‗sets the
limit for all subsequent discussions‘ (Hall et al., 1978) from Bush Jr. to Pope Benedict
XVI. These frames were ‗taken-for-granted‘ and presented as ‗common sense‘. First,
Islam is ‗monolithic religion‘ where diversity in understanding Islam was ignored and
Islam was presented as a static and rigid religion. Second, Islam is a violent religion,
where acts of few violent Muslims were considered representative of Islam itself as a
religion, and thus led to the assumption that each Muslim has a tendency towards being
violent. Third, Islam is a sexist religion, where the veil was viewed as a tool for the
oppression of Muslim women, who are victims that need to be rescued. Fourth, Muslims
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are irrational people incapable of scientific thinking or reasoning. Fifth, Islam is the
source of terrorism while the West is the source of democracy. Here, Islam is seen as
despotic religion which needs the intervention of the West to be modernized and
democratized.
Competing frames were absent in the political discourse. For example, a
contextual frame could have investigated the reasons that led some Muslims to be
terrorists, or a self-choice framing of the veil as a personal freedom. Overall, the absence
of a framing contest led to a resurgence of the Oriental discourse and its current avatar
the clash of civilizations which ‗became a central framing mechanism under the Bush
administration‘ (Kumar, 2010, p. 255) and it is still influential even after Bush era.
Although few studies actually examined the effects of media Orientalist framing
of Muslims, Islamophobia was regarded as the major consequence (Kumar, 2010, Powell;
2011). Shaw (2012) found that when right-wing hardliners anti-Islam discourse prevailed
in the British press, discriminating against Muslims and marginalizing Islam, more
hostility and fear of Muslims was reported in media and reflected in government actions.
Powell (2011) found US media framing to increase public support for foreign policy
attacking Muslim countries. Another consequence would be increasing Muslim‘s feeling
of exclusion and also public perception of Muslims ―otherness‖ as found in the Australian
context (Rane & Hersi, 2012). A Pew poll in 2006 found that non-Muslims in Western
countries believed that there is a ―conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a
modern society‖. However, some studies found that negative attitudes towards Islam
were not a direct result of media influence such as Brockett and Baird (2008) on British
media.
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Framing Islamists
Few studies were found to focus on media representation of Islamists in Muslim
countries, and even fewer were conducted on Western countries. This may be due to the
fact that Western media has often dealt with Islam as a singular monolithic religion
without variations (Said, 1997). Although Mahony (2010) who compared framing of
Islamists between Australian and Indonesian newspapers, cautioned against comparison
between a Western and a Muslim context in covering Islamic movements because of the
difference in culture and knowledge of the topic, other studies detected similarities
between Western media representations of Muslims and non-Western media portrayals of
Islamists. Moreover, Egyptian cinema was found to align with the stereotypical
representations that reflect an Orientalist approach, but this time from Muslims towards
Islamic movements (Armbrust, 2002; Allagui & Najjar, 2011; Khatib, 2006).
In Western contexts, the prevailing themes in covering Islamic groups were that
‗political Islam‘ is incompatible with democracy, and, again, terrorism is a key
component of Islamist ideology and practice. This was apparent in US and Australian
press (Mishra, 2008; Mahony, 2010). US prestige newspapers coverage of political Islam
in Turkey, Iran and Iraq implied the conflict between Islam and democracy. As Mishra
indicated ‗any politically assertive role for Islam, violent or peaceful… [was framed] as a
threat to Western civilization and democracy‘ (p. 171). In this view, Muslim countries
that witnessed popularity of Islamic parties were portrayed as might-be another Iran.
When covering Iran, US newspapers usually highlighted the Islamic nature of the regime,
and attached this to its unpopularity among youth. Moreover, US newspapers implied an
association between political Islam and lack of commitment to human rights and abuse of
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women rights. Furthermore, any public role for religion was portrayed as irrational. As a
result, US media emphasized that Islam should be reformed to move from ―Islamism to
secularism, from tradition to Western modernity, from anti-Western to pro-Western
attitudes‖ (p.173), and only that secularized and Westernized modern version of Islam
can be compatible with democracy.
Very little counter frames were provided by Western media in their coverage of
political Islam (Mishra, 2008; Mahony; 2010). They did not provide the view point of
those who believe of a role of Islam in politics, or even come close to non western
frames. They also provided no counter discourses that challenge the Orientalist
assumptions, such as how the religious can be modern and democratic at the same time.
When competing frames existed, they were the few in commentary, not in the news as in
the case of US press (Mishra, 2008).
In Muslim countries, the main difference in newspapers framing was the
differentiation between Islam and Islamic groups, but distinction between violent and
nonviolent Islamists was not clear in all cases. Khan and Govindasamy (2011) found in
their analysis of editorials in Bangladesh newspapers that all papers represented Islam as
a religion of peace, but they tried to keep a distance with political Islam by emphasizing
the secular nature of the struggle for independence and the secular identity of the
constitution. Militant Muslims were excluded from the rest of society by insisting on the
outside roots of the phenomenon (Khan & Govindasamy, 2011). Mohany (2010) found
similar results when he compared Indonesian newspapers coverage of Islamic groups in
the weeks after terrorist attacks to their Australian counterparts. Indonesian media was
more balanced and representative of the Muslim community, at the same time it
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cooperated with the government and Islamic groups to portray terrorism and violence as
alien to Indonesian Islamic culture.
Framing Islamists in the Egyptian Media
Very few studies were found on Egyptian press coverage of Islamists. One of
these studies addressed the differences in covering Islamic movements between the
Egyptian state-owned Al-Ahram newspaper and the International Herald Tribune
(Dahmash, 2008). The study found that Al-Ahram allocated minimum space to covering
the Muslim Brotherhood and most of the coverage focused on the group practices in 2005
elections ―as if the group suddenly appeared during the elections‖ (Dahmash, 2008). AlAhram coverage of the Brotherhood was found to be unbalanced, since it focused solely
on what it perceived as mistakes and contradictions in the Brotherhood ideology and
actions. In addition, Al-Ahram accused the Brotherhood of using violence and associated
the group with violent Islamic movements. It also claimed that the group conspired with
the British occupation on Egypt at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Dahmash
(2008) also found that Al-Ahram did not provide any view point supporting or even
neutral to the Muslim Brotherhood in its coverage. Thus, the Brotherhood was mainly
introduced as ―the antagonist‖ in Al-Ahram coverage (Dahmash, 2008). On the contrary,
the International Herald Tribune was found to be more neutral to the Muslim
Brotherhood representing it as an opposition group that suffered oppression with other
opposition forces under the authoritarian Arab regimes (Dahmash, 2008)
Most of the research on Islamic movements in the Egyptian media addressed the
representation of Islamists in Egyptian movies. The few variations that existed in the
news media of Muslim countries did not find its way to the cinema in Egypt, one of the
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largest Muslim countries. This can be attributed to difference between news media and
cultural products. Movie frames may be more extreme than news frames due to the fact
the first is predominantly fictional while the other should be factual. However, an
examination of representation of Islamic groups in Egyptian movies in the 1990s and the
beginning of 21st century leads to the conclusion that Islamic groups were portrayed
similarly to Muslims in Western media, through an Orientalist lens (Armbrust 2002;
Allagui & Najjar, 2011; Khatib, 2006). . But some specifics were added, and more
frames (though not very diverse) existed.
Egyptian cinema representation of Islamic groups employed the frames of
terrorism/violence, anti-modernity, women victimization, and incompatibility with
democracy. The terrorism frame dominated the presentation of Islamic groups in
Egyptian movies (Allagui & Najjar, 2011; Khatib, 2006). They were presented as being
necessarily violent and any association with them as an association with terrorism. The
main behavior associated with Islamic groups in Egyptian cinema was violence
(Armbrust, 2002) whether as a result of revenge or as a method of social reform.
Violence actions depicted included killing Christians, tourists, and policemen, destruction
of video stores, musical instruments and cafes, threatening people for different reasons,
and verbal violence through angry manifestos and slogans.
Islamists were also shown in Egyptian cinema as anti-modern and medieval in
their lifestyle and thinking, in comparison with progressive Egyptians (Khatib, 2006).
Armbrust (2002) found that Egyptian movies created a discrepancy between Islamism
which was associated with darkness and ignorance, and enlightenment which was
associated with materialism and science. But in recent films the representation was
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contradictory; Islamists were shown as ‗mystical, primitive, simple-minded and yet the
most worldly and accomplished liar and manipulator‘ (Bhabha, 1983, p. 34).
Moreover, Egyptian movies were found to contrast between two stereotypes of
women in framing Islamic groups. First, some women were framed as being oppressed by
men‘s authority, with the veil serving as a manifestation of her oppression. Second, films
also featured a ‗modern woman‘ who says no to Islamists (Allagui, & Najjar, 2011, p.
218). In both cases, sexual repression was also presented as part of Islamists‘ disturbed
personalities.
Furthermore, Egyptian movies reproduced the Egyptian government discourse on
Islamic group as a threat to democracy (Khatib, 2006), emphasizing that an Islamic state
can never be democratic. Some movies promoted the conspiracy frame by attributing
Islamism to outside roots and depicting it as a conspiracy with a hidden agenda and
unknown external sources of finance (Allagui & Najjar, 2011). Islamists were also
viewed as a threat to national unity (Khatib, 2006) and the source of sectarian violence
targeting Christians in Egypt (Allagui & Najjar, 2011).
Egyptian cinema offered some frames that did not exist in Western media. The
movies provided different reasons for affiliation with Islamic groups (Armbrust, 2002;
Khatib, 2006; Allagui & Najjar, 2011): (1) poverty and its associations including
unemployment, and ignorance, (2) Frustration or psychological distress as a result of
poverty or of isolation and marginalization by the government and richer classes, (3)
immigration, especially to Gulf countries which attributed Islamism to outside roots, and
(4) corruption and ineffective governance. In the latter, Islamists were shown to flourish
in slum areas which suffered from poverty, marginalization and consequential aggression
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and violence whether by authority or by society. They were also shown to be capable of
recruit only vulnerable people from the lower classes, and sometimes even through failed
state institutions. The reasoning for joining Islamic groups as provided by Islamists in the
movies was religious ideology, and social reform/morality, however, the dominating
theme was that no one became Islamist by self-choice, but due to the context. Revenge
was the main reason for affiliation provided by other parties in the movies including the
government and society; Islamists were framed as victims of the torture and humiliation
committed by authorities that provoked them seek revenge.
Egyptian movies also represented Islamic groups as interest-driven not ideologybased. Unlike Western framing which attributed Islamists behavior to their Islamic
ideology, Islamists were depicted in Egyptian cinema as corrupt and hypocritical, not
because of their ideology, but because they diverged from Islam (Khatib, 2006). Thus,
using violence or seeking public office was for personal gains like revenge and wealth.
Egyptian movies introduced two alternatives in dealing with Islamic groups
(Allagui & Najjar, 2011). The first solution was violence and coercion by authorities,
which led to the conclusion that death is the result of joining Islamists. In many cases this
was shown as the primary reason for Islamists‘ violence. The other alternative was
offered by society where there are two possible positions; either denial and social
isolation, or collaboration with authorities in their fight with Islamists. A third way of
rehabilitation was less depicted in movies.
Two recent films offered some counter framing. Unlike traditional government
supported films, these films provided more contextual evidence and different explanation
for Islamism popularity, including state in-effectiveness, the world order, and Israeli
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occupation of Palestine (Allagui, & Najjar, 2011). One movie come out of the traditional
treatment that depicts Islamists as ‗uncivilized bigots and potential terrorists who practice
a primitive or violent religion‘ (Karim, 2003, p. 96), it instead show them as modern
people whether in dress, language or behavior.
Some studies suggested absent frames that emerge from the real analysis of the
Islamists phenomena. Armbrust (2002) suggested representing some Islamists as
embracing modernity; they are educated people working in different professions, and as a
result of ‗political blockage‘. Allagui, & Najjar (2011) proposed frames that focus on the
developmental role Islamists play in poor areas resembled in institutions like mosques,
schools, cliniques, and banks which not only compensate for state ineffectiveness, but
also provide power for Islamic groups.
Just like their Western counterparts, Egyptian cinema reproduced government
discourse on Islamists. The dominance of themes like Islamists as a threat to democracy
and national unity was only a repetition of government discourse (Khatib, 2006). Some
films like ‗the Terrorist‘ were even considered to be promoted and encouraged by the
Egyptian government in its fight against terrorism to prevent the audience from
sympathizing with Islamists and to provide public support for government actions
(Allagui & Najjar, 2011).
Despite being represented mostly in Egyptian cinema as a home-grown
phenomenon, Islamic groups were framed as the ‗Other‘, according to the Orientalist
discourse, in Egyptian movies (Allagui & Najjar, 2011). By doing so, Egyptian cinema
was ‗colonial‘; relying on ‗us‘ and ‗them‘ presentation, where Islamists are framed as
‗alien and inferior‘ to the society, ‗lacking ‗our‘ morals and being essentially different
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from ‗us‘ (Khatib, 2006, p.76). This aligns with western representation of the same
phenomena, far from its reality, though for different nationalistic reasons (Armbrust,
2002; Khatib, 2006). In both cases, the Orientalist discourse was used as a tool to either
provoke fear of or exert control on that ‗Other‘ (Mishra, 2008). In this sense:
‗…both East and West do not seem to be divided that much after all.
Thus, the East tries to exclude a part of itself as an 'Other', while the
West excludes it‘ (Khatib, 2006, p.77).
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III.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: FRAMING THEORY

Although framing studies have been very popular in recent years, there is still
some ambiguity in the definition of framing (Scheufele, 1999; Borah, 2011), partly due to
the comprehensive nature of most of its definitions (Weaver, 2007). But the underlying
assumption remains the same. Any issue or event can be viewed from multiple
perspectives, and can be presented as related to multiple beliefs, values or considerations
(Chong & Druckman, 2007).
According to Entman (1993) ―to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived
reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote
a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment
recommendation for the item described‖ (p. 50). But frames don‘t necessarily include all
four functions. Thus, de Vreese (2005) suggested that a frame is merely ―an emphasis in
salience of different aspects of a topic‖ (p. 53).
Gamson and Modigliani (1989) defined a frame as ―a central organizing idea…
for making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue‖ (p. 3). Frames are the
internal structures of what they call ―media packages‖ which are the sub- units of any
media discourse. Media packages consisted of framing devices and reasoning devices.
Framing devices are ―condensing symbols… [that suggest] how to think about the issue‖
such as metaphors, historical examples, catchphrases, depictions, and images. These are
different from reasoning devices ―that justify what should be done about [the issue]‖ like
arguments on causes, consequences and moral evaluations (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989,
p. 3).
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Some researchers, like Callaghan and Schnell (2001), proposed a very narrow
definition of frames as explicit or implicit arguments. Thus, equating frames with
arguments of different positions. But in Gamson and Modigliani view (1989) frames are
not positions, a frame may include many positions that share its underlying assumptions,
and every issue-frame can include both pro and against positions. In this sense a frame
provides a context (Tankard, Hendrickson, Silberman, Bliss, & Ghanem, 1991), which
lends itself to more than one position.
Framing and Agenda-setting
Framing is sometimes described as the second level of Agenda-setting. Agendasetting as a theory of mass media focus on the perceived importance the media gives to
different issues, and what effect this might have on public perception about the
importance of these issues. The first level of agenda-setting analyzes the salience of
issues in the media, whereas framing as a second level of agenda-setting focus on the
salience of the issue attributes (de Vreese, 2005). But some researchers argued that this
implies that issues or objects are more general than the attributes which is not always the
case like in the ‗Cold War‘ frame (Weaver, 2007).
In Agenda-setting, framing as a second level is defined as ―the selection of a
restricted number of thematically related attributes for inclusion on the media agenda
when a particular object is discussed‖ (Weaver, 2007).
Media Framing Process
Generally, framing is a process by which people build or change their
understanding for issues (Chong & Druckman, 2007). In communication, Entman (1993)
argued that frames exist in four location across the communication process; in the mind
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of the communicator which influence his decisions, in the communicative text, in the
receiver‘s mind which may or may not agree with the communicator‘s frame or the text
frame, and finally in culture which is ―the stock of commonly invoked frames‖ (Entman,
1993, p. 53).
As a process, framing could be divided to four phases: frame-building, framesetting, individual level consequences of framing, and societal level consequences of
framing which also include a feedback from audience to media frames (Scheufele, 1999;
de Vreese, 2005). Frame-building involves all the processes that influence how
journalists create or change frames (Scheufele, 1999), like the interaction between
journalists, elites and social movements. The frame - which is the outcome of this phase is influenced by many factors that are internal and external to the media environment (de
Vreese, 2005). Frame setting is the interaction between media frames and audience preexisting frames (de Vreese, 2005). The third stage includes all individual level effects of
framing like changing attitudes and behavior (Scheufele, 1999). The fourth stage is the
societal influences of framing on processes like ―political socialization, decision-making
and collective action‖ (de Vreese, 2005, p. 52). Scheufele (1999) added a feedback from
audience to media frames because journalists are also audience members who are
‗susceptible‘ to the same frames they often use.
Frame Production
Many factors may affect the outcome of the frame-building process. Gamson and
Modigliani (1989) identified three factors: culture, sponsors activities, and media
practices. First, cultural resonance affects the appeal of frames among audience who
share this culture. But it is important to note that the same culture can support both the
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frames and the counter frames that may be provoked on an issue. In Gamson and
Modigliani‘s (1989) study of US media framing of nuclear power, they found a
‗progress‘ frame which favored technological advancement but also a counter frame that
emphasized the desire to preserve nature from nuclear dangers, and both frames had their
roots in the broad American culture. Second, sponsors activities, or, in Entman‘s (2007)
words, the public relations skills of those who promote certain frames, like public
officials, political parties and social movements, affect the outcome of the frame-building
process. In these activities frames are adapted to journalism norms and values to be sold
to journalists (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Although journalists may try to be objective
as much as possible, still their reporting might reflect the dominant frame that inhibits
audience from assessing the situation correctly. Journalists unconsciously often ―allow
the most skillful media manipulators to impose their dominant frames on the news‖
(Entman, 1993, p. 57). The third factor is media practices which decisively affect the
outcome of frame production process (Iyengar, 2005; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989) often
leading to framing bias.
Framing Bias
Frames are not only products of journalists‘ perception of reality, but also of
journalism market competition on audience (Stout & Buddenbaum, 2003) which demands
certain media practices. In his study of framing social movements, Boykoff (2006)
provided an explanation for unconscious framing bias that happens as a result of
interrelated media norms. News frames are not a conspiracy against those who are framed
negatively. But news values, that determine what news is and how to frame it, lend
themselves to negative representation of social movements (Boykoff, 2006). Values like
52

novelty, drama, personalization, fragmentation (due to lack of contextual data), and
authority-disorder (news media tendency to rely in times of crisis on official sources that
assures everything will be good soon) all lead to shallow framing of social movement
(Boykoff, 2006). But several studies also found that journalists have a tendency to rely
on the official narration of issues all the time, and even when this narration is challenged
it is largely within the same underlying frame (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Entman
(2010) highlights the tendency of the media to treat ―political process critically but policy
substance passively‖ (p. 395). There is also the balance norm which is activated when
journalists detect an established critique to a narration, in this case journalists tend to
reduce the debate on an issue to the two different views of the ―legal‖ challengers, for
example Republicans and Democrats in the US. Other minor or ‗illegal‘ challengers are
excluded along with their frames (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). In their study of the
news framing of anti-nuclear movement in US, Entman and Rojecki (1993) found that
media frames reproduced government narratives on the issue and officials reactions to the
less-covered social movement despite the fact that the public opposed the government.
Entman (2007) proposed an overarching paradigm to integrate the concepts of
framing, agenda-setting and priming in the study of news slanting and bias, and how
these phenomena influence the distribution of power in democratic societies. He focused
on two kinds of bias: content bias, and decision biases. Content bias occurs when news
stories favor one side over the other/s. Decision biases stems from three different sources:
Journalistic values or market competition, evaluation of the political game and
ideological biases. News slanting or content bias is the result of interaction between
perceived facts, media skills of each side in the conflict, the three different kinds of
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decision biases, in addition to event‘s context and audience schema (Entman, 2007;
2010). A similar conclusion was reached by Aday (2010) in analyzing US network news
coverage of Iraq and Afghanistan wars in 2005. He suggested that the ability of a
president to preserve positive framing (which doesn‘t necessarily mean positive news)
depends on a number of factors including events themselves, news media focus on these
events and the degree of counter framing from opposition.
Framing effects
The way media frames events and issues affects how audience perceive them, and
consequently develop opinions, attitudes and behaviors towards them (Entman, 1993;
Fornaciari, 2011; Chong & Druckman, 2007). Detection of frames in the media does not
guarantee that they will influence audience, because any effect depends on the interaction
between media frames and audience frames. Audience frames (which are also called
schemata and/or stereotypes) can be defined as ―mentally stored clusters of ideas that
guide individual processing of information‖ (Entman, 1993, p. 53).
In the study of framing effects on the individual level, researchers differentiate
moderators from mediators. Moderating variables like individual values, knowledge and
source credibility condition framing effects (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Mediating
variables are psychological processes that mediate framing effects such as the
availability, accessibility and applicability of frames on a certain issue.
Framing effects are based on many factors. In addition to individual beliefs and
considerations, also the strength and emphasis on a frame, and the existence and the
features of competing frames should be examined (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Entman
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(1993) argued that in explaining framing effects, included and excluded frame are equally
important.
Framing, political power, and public opinion
Societal effects of framing include their effects on government policy, and public
opinion. Frames define ―the boundaries of acceptable discourse‖ (Entman, 1993, p .55).
Alternatives outside these boundaries are not likely to affect policy or enjoy public
support. By defining what is normal, the mass media then excludes dissent movements as
abnormal (Boycoff, 2006).
Another consequence is that once a frame is established, it is harder to challenge
it. Using another frame may lead to either a perception of lack of credibility or failure to
understand in part of the audiences (Entman, 1993). In this sense, framing is a way to
assess the division of power through communication texts; a news frame is ―the imprint
of power – it registers the identity of actors or interests that competed to dominate the
text‖ (Entman, 1993, p. 55). Thus, media discourse is ―a place of ideological and
ideational struggle for various social movements, state actors, and institutions‖ (Boykoff,
2006, p. 227).
Moreover, when elites control the framing of public issues, they determine what
the public opinion is (through polls and votes). This raise doubts on what truly constitute
the public opinion if its manifestations can all be influenced by framing (Entman, 1993).
What makes things worse is that journalists‘ perceptions about public opinion, even if
inaccurate, also affect their framing of issues (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989).
Slanted framing is common and though its effect might be minor on the larger
population according to many studies, the small percentage that is affected can be of great
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influence either for being political elites or being determinant in a political race like in the
case of a close elections (Entman, 2010).
Entman and Rojecki (1993) in their study of newspapers framing of anti-nuclear
movement from 1980-1983 found that negative media framing of the social movement
inhibited its success despite the fact that the majority of Americans supported its
argument. Negative framing discouraged ordinary people who support the movement but
are not members in it from joining its activities, it also discourages the movement itself
from demanding ‗a place on government agenda‘ and a government response to their
policy proposals. This resulted in a symbolic rather than a concrete response from
government to the movement‘s concerns.
On the other hand, Boykoff (2006) found that media frames force social
movements to be more radical in order to get media attention that is based on news
values. Social movements are incited by the media to create ‗pseudo-events‘ that are
marked with exaggerated rhetoric and sometimes militancy in order to grab media
attention (Boykoff, 2006).
Research on Framing
In framing research, frames can be dependent or independent variables. They can
also be inductive emerging from the text or deductive meaning that they are defined
before examining the text (de Vreese, 2005). Identify a news frame, four conditions must
be met (de Vreese, 2005). It must have recognized characteristics (linguistic or
conceptual), it must be commonly used by journalists, it must be recognizable by others,
and it should be distinguished from other frames. But studies also found that frames
overlap and may exist within the same news story (Boykoff, 2006). So researchers tend to
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identify the dominant frame by distinguishing core facts (that might be the same across
different media) from elements that carrying a frame or ‗framing devices‘. De Vreese
(2005) reviewed scholarly research and gathered many elements that could be examined
as ‗framing devices‘. They included: language choice, metaphors, examples, catchy
phrases, depictions and visual images. Also headlines, subheads, photos and their
captions, leads, sources selected, quotes selected from sources, pull quotes, logos,
statistics and charts, and concluding statements and paragraphs (de Vreese, 2005, p. 54).
Types of Frames
1. Media Frames and Audience Frames
Frames can be classified along many criteria. Researchers distinguish between
audience or individual frames, and media frames (Scheufele, 1999), or ―frame in thought‖
and ―frame in communication.‖ The set of factors that affect an individual‘s judgment
―constitute an individual‘s frame in thought,‖ whereas organization and interpretation of
information presented by a speaker constitute the frame in communication (Chong &
Druckman, 2007). Frames in communication can be produced by the media, government,
politicians, activists, interest groups, social movements and in some cases members of the
audience themselves.
2. Analytical and Judgment frames
The content of the frame as well as its direction affect support for different
policies (de Vreese, 2005). Some frames imply a value judgment of one direction, while
others are analytical categories which can be of neutral, positive or negative judgments
(Boykoff, 2006). Determining a frame direction is necessary to assess its effect.
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3. Episodic and Thematic
Iyengar (2005) found on his study of the coverage of social issues in US news
media that social issues were covered episodically as issues related to and limited to
certain events, not thematically as issues with complex and continuously-developing
context. Boycoff (2006) also found the same in US media coverage of social movements.
It is episodic rather than thematic. This leads to media failure to focus on ideas, context,
and issues raised by social movements, and instead the light is shed on the events created
by social movements and the participants in these events. Eventually this leads to
shallow, misinformed and biased coverage which overall create a negative image that
discourage participation in social movements.
4.

Issue-specific frames and generic frames

Another classification of frames is Issue-specific and generic frames. A
disadvantage of issue-specific frames is that they do not enable comparison across issues
or generalization to a set of issues, they may also make researchers find what they are
looking for. Generic frames on the other hand may reveal patterns in news coverage (de
Vreese, 2005).
Some generic frames have been repeated across some studies in different contexts
(Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; Fornaciari, 2011), like the human impact or human face
frame where the focus is on how individuals are affected by an issue or event
emphasizing an emotional angle, the powerlessness frame depicting how weak
individuals or groups are dominated by others, the economics or economic consequences
frame emphasizing economic costs, gains or losses of an issue on individuals, groups, or
countries, the morality frame which refers to sources of moral judgment like religion or
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moral norms, the conflict frames which views an issue or an event as a contest between
individuals, groups or countries with winners and losers, and the responsibility frame
which attributes the responsibility of causing or solving an issue to an individual,
government or group. Some frames were found to dominate in certain periods. Like the
game frame in elections seasons, where the news media predict electoral success using
competition vocabulary (de Vreese, 2005). Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) found that
the use of different news frames was related to media type and the topic covered. Serious
media outlets relied more on responsibility and conflict frames, while the human interest
frame appeared more in sensationalist media.
An example of issue-specific frames can be found in the literature on framing
social movements. Entman and Rojecki (1993) revealed seven ‗evaluative dimensions‘ in
news stories that might affect social movements ability to gain public and/or elite support
because journalists take subjective decisions on these dimensions. They include
rationality or emotionality of movement ideas, expertise of the movement that might
enable it to propose valid policies, the amount of public support, unity among the
movement on its goal, its level of extremism in comparison with the mainstream, and its
power in influencing government decisions.
Boykoff (2006) analyzed US news media coverage of the global justice
movement in 1999 and 2000. He revealed four main frames: the violence, disruption,
freak, ignorance and amalgam of grievances frames. The violence frame focused on
violent protestors or potential violent protestors. The disruption frame focused on either
disruption of official work and meetings, or disruption of ordinary people‘s lives. The
freak frame magnified the differences between protestors and the mainstream society and
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considered the most radical members as a representation of the whole movement. Also in
this frame the multilingual, multiethnic and multinational nature of the protestors was
emphasized to prove their weirdness. In the ignorance frame protestors are presented as
either ―ignorant or uninformed‖ (p. 218) and again this is generalized to the whole
movement. The ―amalgam of grievances‖ frame represented protestors as fighting for too
many causes. This neutral frame was presented negatively more than positively. News
media also presented protestors as opposing natural phenomena like trade, while this was
not the case. In Boycoff view (2006) it was like saying that protestors against genetically
modified food are against food. Moreover, Boycoff found that television news relied
more on frames of visual nature like violence and disruption, while newspapers relied
more in frames that are built on details like freak, and ignorance frames.
5. Inductive and deductive approaches to framing
Scholars used two approaches in framing research. The ‗deductive approach‘
defines a set of frames before examining the communication text, while the ‗inductive
approach‘ let frames ‗emerge… during the course of analysis‘ from the communication
text itself (de Vreese, 2005, p. 53).
Building on studies of media representation of Islam, Muslims and Islamists and
on framing literature, this study used both the inductive and deductive approaches to
framing. It ended up with a set of 11 frames. Some are generic and some are specific to
the Egyptian context.
The ―anti-democracy‖ frame introduced Islamists as seeking only to consolidate
their power, working for their own interests and against the people‘s good, excluding
others, standing against basic freedoms and the rule of law, assaulting judiciary,
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exercising dictatorship, repressing their opponents, and forcing a theological state.
Attached with this frame was the ‗Brotherhoodization of the State‘ theme which, similar
to Islamization in the Western media, viewed any appointment of an Islamist in state
institutions as part of a plan to strengthen the Muslim Brotherhood control over the state
and change its identity.
The ―violence‖ frame emphasized the potential violent nature of Islamic groups
whether violence actually occurred or not, describing them as expressing anger, and
hostility, and threatening people. If violence occurred, their potential involvement is
highlighted; they are accused of killing and injuring people, and damaging properties.
They are also introduced as sympathizers with terrorists. The frame is marked by use of
war vocabulary even when describing non-violent incidents.
The ―anti-revolution‖ frame depicted Islamic groups as standing against the
January 25th revolution, deceiving the revolutionaries, wasting revolutions‘ gains and
betraying the martyrs. They also were presented as having secret deals with the previous
regime, its remnants or the SCAF, and sabotaging the revolution from the youth for their
own benefit.
The ―anti-modernity‖ frame depicted Islamists as a threat to the Egyptian identity;
showing them as medieval in their lifestyle and thinking, as opposing culture, arts and
literature, as fanatics who provoke sectarian clashes. They are also presented as primitive,
ignorant, blindly obeying their leaders and easily deceived
The ―internal conflict‖ frame divided Islamic groups like the Muslim Brotherhood
to old guards and new guards or conservatives and reformers, and supposed that Islamic
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groups‘ youth always rebel against their leaders. It also labeled any disagreement among
different Islamic groups as a major conflict where each group deems the other un-Islamic.
The ―hypocrisy‖ frame represented Islamists as non-devout corrupt un-credible
Muslims who use religious symbols to deceive people and reach power. They were also
depicted as anti-Al-Azhar, the official highly-respected Egyptian religious institution.
The ―conspiracy/treason‖ frame illustrated Islamic groups as part of a regional or
international conspiracy against Egypt involving different parties and countries ranging
from Hamas and Hizbollah to Qatar, the US and Israel. They were presented as having
hidden agendas and depending on external sources of finance, along with affiliating to
global networks.
The ―polarization‖ frame is similar to the often-used conflict frame, but in the
Egyptian case it framed events in Egyptian transition as an ongoing battle between two
conflicting side: Islamists and the rest of the political forces, or in extreme cases, the
whole society. It focused on extreme views, classifying them to pro and anti-Islamists.
The ―reconciliation‖ frame is the opposite of the polarization frame which the
variety of political positions and focused on the unity of Egyptians in national issues.
The ―politically organized‖ frame emphasized the organizational capabilities and
political outreach of Islamists. And the ―victims of Mubarak regime‖ viewed Islamists as
victims of oppression under Mubarak and his state security apparatus.
In order to reveal the dominant frames of Islamic groups in Egyptian newspapers,
different framing devices and techniques were examined including the content of the
photo, the type of sources quoted or paraphrased, the labels used with Islamists and their
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opponents, and the news story direction towards Islamists mentioned in it. This resulted
in the following main research question:
RQ: How did Egyptian newspapers frame Egyptian Islamic groups in general, and the
Muslim Brotherhood/FJP and the Salafi Call/Al-Nour in particular in the two years
following January 25th revolution? And does this framing differ across newspapers
ownership types, degrees of media professionalism, time periods of changing political
roles of Islamists, or Islamic groups themselves?
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IV.

METHODOLOGY

This study used content analysis to examine the framing of Islamic movements in
Egyptian newspapers in the two years following the Egyptian revolution from 12
February 2011, the day after Mubarak stepped down, to 12 February 2013. Four
newspapers were analyzed: the state-owned Al-Ahram and three private newspapers: AlMasry Al-Youm, Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘, and Al-Dostor. The leading state paper was
selected because it represents one measure of the government‘s official position, and
three different private newspapers were selected because they represent a diversity of
views and positions, and, as discussed below, reflect varying norms of professionalism.
Al-Ahram (The Pyramids) is one of the oldest Egyptian newspapers established in
1875 (Cooper, 2008) and the highest in circulation with around 180 - 190 thousand copies
daily (Employee at the Information and Decision Support Center of the Egyptian
Government - IDSC, personal communication, June 20, 2013). It is largely considered as
representative of state-owned newspapers (Elmasry, 2011). Al-Ahram, and state media in
general, have always performed as the mouthpiece of government, with a special focus on
coverage of government actions (Cooper, 2008; Iskandar, 2012). Therefore it is expected
that the change to an Islamist government after the revolution would yield a
corresponding change in the framing of Islamists – from negative to more positive – in
Al-Ahram.
Previous studies indicated that framing differ among newspapers according to the
level of sensationalism (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000), thus three private newspapers
were chosen according to their level in professional and ethical practices as classified by
the Supreme Press Council (SPC) in Egypt (Hamada, Al-Ghaly, Al-Azrak, & Fikry,
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2013). According to the SPC, Al-Dostor was the highest among Egyptian newspapers in
violating professional and ethical standards (7 – 12 violations per issue); Al-Masry AlYoum was moderate (3 – 6.99 violations per issue) while Al-Youm Al-Sabea was less in
its violations (1 – 1.99 violations per issue), finally Al-Ahram was the least violator of
professional and ethical standards (0 – 0.99 violations per issue). But Al-Ahram is far
from being the hero of journalism standards in Egypt as indicated by prior scholarship. It
has always been government-centered in its coverage (Elmasry, 2012), and its driving
news value appear to be ‗nationalism‘ (Cooper, 2008) which might run against
professional standards.
Al-Masry Al-Youm (The Egyptian Today) is the first Egyptian private newspaper
since the 1952 revolution, and the highest in circulation among private newspapers with
around 150 - 160 thousand copies daily (IDSC employee, personal communication, June
20, 2013) which enables it to compete with Al-Ahram. Al-Masry Al-Youm is owned by
some Egyptian business men including Salah Diab (Ahram Online, 2011), and Naguib
Sawiris the founder of the liberal Free Egyptians party (Baker & Kassem, 2011). Its
coverage of Islamists during Mubarak era has led to the last military trial of Muslim
Brotherhood members before the revolution. In 2006, it claimed that the MB has militias
in a news story on a group of MB-affiliated university students who organized a parade in
Al-Azhar University (AlBehairy, 2006). The paper provided an excuse for a following
Mubarak‘s crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood accusing them of organizing militia
that attempted to overthrow the regime (Al-Khatib, 2007). Al-Masry Al-Youm is
regarded as more flexible in its political coverage from other types of newspapers
ownership in Egypt, thus providing good indicator for the change in the media after the
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revolution (Rayman, 2013). Moreover, Al-Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm can be
considered as the mainstream Egyptian newspapers as defined by Chomsky in 1997.
They have the highest circulation, and they are owned by big corporations. They are the
―agenda-setting…elite media which sets the framework within which others operate‖
(Chomsky, 1997).
Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (The Seventh Day) is a private newspaper that began weekly
in 2008 and turned daily since May 31, 2011(Youm7.com, 2013). Mohammad Al-Amin,
the owner of 16 private satellite channels who is known for his relations with prominent
figures in Mubarak regime, and ―accused by many of backing Mubarak's entourage‖
(Ibrahim, 2012) is one of the partners in Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (Solayman, 2011). Also
partners in Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ are Mohamed El-Morshidy, another businessman under
Mubarak‘s regime, and Alaa El-Kahky, the owner of Media Line Advertising Agency
(Solayman, 2011). Despite its low circulation number of around 24 thousand (IDSC
employee, personal communication, June 20, 2013), Al-Youm Al-Sabea is ranked as the
first Egyptian news website on the internet (Alexa, 2013; Google Zeitgeist, 2012).
Al-Dostor (The Constitution) was republished in 2005 by its editor and founder
Ibrahim Essa. In 2010, Al-Wafd party leader purchased the paper and sacked Essa in a
move that was widely criticized (Peterson, 2011; El-Daragli & El-Gamal, 2010a). He
later sold his share to Reda Edward another prominent Al-Wafd leader (El-Daragli & ElGamal, 2010b). Paper circulation figures dropped sharply and its editorial policy changed
from liberal opposition to anti-revolutionary (Al-Iraqi, 2010; Ali, 2012). The paper is
currently known for its anti-MB editorial policy (Egypt Independent, 2012a).
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Content Analysis is defined as ―a research technique for the systematic,
replicable, and quantitative description of the manifest or latent features of
communication texts‖ (Baxter & Babbie, 2003, p. 240). Four composite weeks – four
randomly selected Sundays, Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, Fridays, and
Saturdays – were selected from the study‘s two-year time period. According to Riffe and
Aust (1993, p. 139) two composite weeks are ‗reliable estimates‘ of one year of coverage
of a daily newspaper. The 28 days were selected using a random calendar date generator
(Random.org) by randomly selecting two Saturdays from the first year and two Saturdays
from the second year, and the same with the rest of week‘s days. The final sample
included the following days:
Year one from Feb 12, 2011 – Feb, 12, 2012
 Saturday, 7 January 2012
Saturday, 28 January 2012
 Sunday, 9 October 2011
Sunday, 30 October 2011
 Monday, 4 July 2011
Monday, 12 September 2011
 Tuesday, 19 April 2011
Tuesday, 14 June 2011
 Wednesday, 13 April 2011
Wednesday, 18 May 2011
 Thursday, 31 March 2011
Thursday, 30 June 2011
 Friday, 1 April 2011
Friday, 23 December 2011
Year two from Feb, 12, 2012 – Feb 12, 2013
 Saturday, 25 February 2012
Saturday, 28 July 2012
 Sunday, 4 November 2012
Sunday, 27 January 2013
 Monday, 2 July 2012
Monday, 4 February 2013
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Tuesday, 28 August 2012
Tuesday, 27 November 2012
Wednesday, 11 April 2012
Wednesday, 28 November 2012
Thursday, 4 October 2012
Thursday, 15 November 2012
Friday, 4 May 2012
Friday, 22 June 2012
Since one of the studied newspapers, Al-Youm Al-Sabea, was issued weekly until

the mid of 2011, the nearest weekly issues were selected to replace the missing days in
that period. This resulted in including the 2011 weekly issues of Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ on
March 29, April 5, 12, 19, May 17, July 5 and 12 in the final sample.
The unit of analysis was every front-page news story which referred to Islamists.
Since information is made salient through place and space (Entman, 1993), front-page
news stories can be regarded as one of the most salient framing devices in a newspaper
issue because they represent what the newspaper considers most important (Elmasry,
2012). They reflect differences in editorial policies, and they are also the most read part
in a newspaper. In the case of Al-Dostor newspaper, the front-page is usually a cover
with headlines only, so the first page that included news stories – the third page in this
case – was analyzed instead.
The sample included all front-page news stories that referred to Islamists in
general, to the Muslim Brotherhood/the Freedom and Justice Party or the Salafi Call/AlNour party in particular in the headline, sub-headlines, the three first paragraphs, and the
photo or the photo caption. The MB and the Salafi Call were chosen because their
respective parties, FJP and Al-Nour, came first in the parliamentary elections in both
upper and lower houses (Carnegie, 2012). The final sample included 197 news stories: 22
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from Al-Ahram, 45 from Al-Masry al-Youm, 55 from Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ and 75 from
Al-Dostor.
For each front-page news story, the researcher analyzed topic choice, Islamists
mentioned, content of photo, labels used with Islamists and their opponents, types of
source quoted or paraphrased in addition to the dominant news frame and its direction
towards each Islamic movement mentioned in the story. Two independent coders – both
are graduate students of social sciences at the American University in Cairo -- were
trained on the coding scheme (Appendix A) before analyzing a sub-sample of 29 news
stories. All variables except one scored more than 0.7 in Scott‘s Pi as a measurement of
the inter-coder reliability (Appendix B). They were mostly centered around .9. Only one
variable scored below .7 – 0.653 – which is considered ―acceptable‖ (Shoemaker, 2003).
It was whether Salafi parties other than the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party were mentioned in
the news stories. Further explanation of which parties/movements are considered Salafi
were added to the coding scheme to ease classification.
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V.

RESULS

Of the 28 examined front pages for each of the four studied newspapers, it was
found that Al-Dostor referred to Islamists on its front-page news stories more than the
three other papers with 75 (38%) articles compared to 55 (27.9%) in Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘
and 45 (22.8%) in Al-Masry Al-Youm, while Al-Ahram was the least to refer to Islamists
in its front-page news articles (11.2%, n = 22).
Topic
Islamic groups were mainly covered in front-page news stories on protests, sit-ins
and strikes (18.8%, n = 37), elections or referendums (13.2%, n = 26), violence - whether
from police/military, among protestors or sectarian violence - (9.6%, n = 19), news
stories on politicians activities and statements (8.6%, n = 17), international relations
(7.1%, n = 14), and religious affairs (6.6%, n =13).
There was no significant difference among the four newspapers in their choice of
front-page topics where Islamists were mentioned, χ2 (48, N = 197) = 50.71, p = .37 (See
Table 1). But some important differences existed. Al-Ahram was the highest to feature
Islamists in topics related to protests, sit-ins and strikes (27.3%, n = 6) followed by AlDostor (20%, n = 15), Al-Youm Al-Sabea (16.4%, n = 9), and Al-Masry Al-Youm
(15.6%, n = 7). Al-Ahram was also more likely to mention Islamists in stories of
elections or referendums (27.3%, n = 6), than Al-Masry Al-Youm (15.6%, n = 7), AlYoum Al-Sabea‘ (12.7%, n =7) and Al-Dostor (8%, n = 6). Al-Masry Al-Youm referred
to Islamists more in news stories on violence (15.6%, n = 7) more than Al-Youm AlSabea‘ (9.1%, n = 5), Al-Ahram (9.1%, n = 2), or Al-Dostor (6.7%, n = 5). Also Al-
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Dostor covered Islamists on stories related to crime (10.7%, n = 8) more than other
newspapers: Al-Masry Al-Youm (4.4%, n = 2), and Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (1.8%, n = 1).
Table 1
Differences in Topics according to Newspaper
Topic
Al-Ahram
6
27.3%
6
Elections /Referendums
27.3%
2
Violence (police,
protestors & sectarian)
9.1%
0
Politicians statements &
activities
0.0%
1
Foreign Affairs
4.5%
0
Religious Affairs, trends
0.0%
2
Constitution, Constituent
Assembly
9.1%
2
Law/Judicial Bodies
9.1%
0
Crime
0.0%
1
Presidency decisions
/actions
4.5%
1
Political parties
4.5%
0
Political meetings
0.0%
0
Legislative bodies
0.0%
22
Total
100.0%
χ2 (48, N = 197) = 50.71, p = .37
Protests, sit-ins & strikes

Newspaper
Al-Masry Al- Al-Youm AlYoum
Sabea'
7
9
15.6%
16.4%
7
7
15.6%
12.7%
7
5
15.6%
9.1%
3
5
6.7%
9.1%
2
6
4.4%
10.9%
3
6
6.7%
10.9%
3
5
6.7%
9.1%
4
1
8.9%
1.8%
2
1
4.4%
1.8%
5
2
11.1%
3.6%
2
2
4.4%
3.6%
0
2
0.0%
3.6%
0
1
0.0%
1.8%
45
55
100.0%
100.0%
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Total
Al-Dostor
15
20.0%
6
8.0%
5
6.7%
9
12.0%
5
6.7%
4
5.3%
2
2.7%
4
5.3%
8
10.7%
2
2.7%
5
6.7%
2
2.7%
3
4.0%
75
100.0%

37
18.8%
26
13.2%
19
9.6%
17
8.6%
14
7.1%
13
6.6%
12
6.1%
11
5.6%
11
5.6%
10
5.1%
10
5.1%
4
2.0%
4
2.0%
197
100.0%

Islamists covered
The Muslim Brotherhood, or its political wing the Freedom and Justice Party, was
the most covered Islamic movement in the sampled newspapers (See Table 2, Figure 1).
It was mentioned in 79.2% (n = 156) of the sample. Islamists in general with no
specifications were mentioned in (31%, n = 61) of the sample, including 24 articles
(12.18% of the total sample) that referred to the Salafis in general with no specifications.
The Salafi Call or its political wing Al-Noor Party was identified in 20.3% (n = 40) of the
news stories. Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya or its Al-Binaa w Al-Tanmia party came in the
fourth place (11.2%, n = 22). Other Salafi parties and groups like Al-Asala, Al-Fadial,
Al-Watan or the Salafi Front received less coverage (5.6%, n = 11), along with Al-Wasat
party (4.1%, n = 8), and Hazem Abu Ismail supporters (3%, n = 6). One article mentioned
Al-Haya al-Shariyya lil-Haquq wa-l Islah (the Islamic Legitimate Body of Rights and
Reform); it was in Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘.
Figure 1
Frequency of mentioning different Islamic movements
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Table 2
Frequency of Islamic movements and parties mentioned in different newspapers
Islamic Group
AlAl-Masry Al-Youm Al-Dostor
Total
Ahram Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘
MB/FJP
20
39
38
59
156
(90.9%) (86.7%)
(69.1%)
(78.7%)
(79.2%)
The Islamists or The
5
16
23
17
61
Salafis
(22.7%) (35.6%)
(41.8%)
(22.7%)
(31%)
The Salafi Call/Al-Noor
10
16
8
6
40
party
(45.5%) (35.6%)
(14.5%)
(8%)
(20.3%
Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya
5
4
6
7
22
(22.7%)
(8.9%)
(10.9%)
(9.3%)
(11.2%)
Other Salafi groups
2
3
2
4
11
(9.1%)
(6.7%)
(3.6%)
(5.3%)
(5.6%)
Al-Wasat Party
2
3
3
0
8
(9.1%)
(6.7%)
(5.5)
(4.1%)
Abu Ismail Supporters
2
2
1
1
6
(9.1%)
(4.4%)
(1.8%)
(1.3%)
(3%)
No statistically significant difference was found between the four newspapers in
mentioning the Muslim Brotherhood, χ2 (3, N = 197) = 6.78, p = .08. However, AlAhram mentioned them in 90% (n = 5, n = 20) of its sampled articles, followed by AlMasry Al-Youm (86.7%, n = 39), then Al-Dostor (78.7%, n = 59) and Al-Youm AlSabea‘ (69.1%, n = 38).
Differences between the four newspapers in mentioning Islamists in general with
no specifications (including the general reference to the Salafis) were not statistically
significant, χ2 (3, N = 197) = 6.59, p = .09. However, telling differences existed. AlYoum Al-Sabea‘ and Al-Masry Al-Youm were more likely to mention Islamists in
general in 41.8% (n = 23) and 35.6% (n = 16) of their articles respectively. This is much
more than Al-Ahram and Al-Dostor (22.7% of the articles for each) which apparently
prefer to specify the Islamic group they are talking about.
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There was also no significant difference among the four newspapers in covering
other Islamic groups except for The Salafi Call and its Al-Noor party, χ2 (3, N = 197) =
23.21, p = .00. Al-Ahram mentioned The Salafi Call/Al-Noor party in almost half of its
front-page news stories on Islamists (45.5%, n = 10), more than Al-Masry Al-Youm did
(35.6%, n = 16) and far more than Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (14.5%, n = 8) or Al-Dostor (8%,
n = 6).
Although no statistically significant differences were found among the four
studied newspapers in mentioning Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya, χ2 (3, N = 197) = 6.78, p =
.08. Al-Ahram was more likely to mention it in 22.7% (n= 5) of its articles, almost twice
as Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (10.9%, n = 6), Al-Dostor (9.3%, n = 7) and Al-Masry Al-Youm
(8.9%, n = 4). The same with Al-Wasat party, it was more mentioned in Al-Ahram
(9.1%, n = 2), than Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘. Al-Dostor never
mentioned Al-Wasat in its stories on Islamists.
Photo Content
Of all 197 news stories analyzed, a total of 70.6% (n = 139) had photos published
with them. Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ published photos with its front-page news articles on
Islamists more than the three other newspapers (90.9%, n = 50), followed by Al-Masry
Al-Youm (84.4%, n = 38). Al-Dostor came third with 58.7% (n = 44), and finally AlAhram (31.8%, n = 7). These differences were found statistically significant, χ2 (3, N =
197) = 36.14, p = .00
Overall, personal photos were dominant (56.8%, n = 79) except for Al-Ahram
(0%), followed by photos of protests (19.4%, n = 27), then photos of political meetings
(5.8%, n = 8).
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Data analysis revealed significant difference among the sampled newspapers in
the content of the photo that accompanied front-page news stories on Islamic movements,
χ2 (42, N = 139) = 90.08, p = .00, especially in relation to protests and personal photos
(See Table 3). The majority of Al-Dostor photos were personal (70.5%, n = 31), followed
by Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (56%, n = 28), then Al-Masry Al-Youm (52.6%, n = 20). AlAhram didn‘t display personal photos at all, but was far more likely to publish protest
photos (42.9%, n = 3) followed by Al-Masry Al-Youm (23.7%, n = 9) than Al-Youm AlSabea‘ (16%, n = 8) and Al-Dostor (15.9%, n = 7). Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ was the highest
among the sampled newspapers to publish photos of political meetings (12%, n = 6) far
more than Al-Masry Al-Youm (2.6%, n = 1) or Al-Dostor (2.3%, n = 1), Al-Ahram never
did so.
Table 3
Difference among newspapers in content of first photo in new articles on Islamists
Newspaper
Photo Content
Al-Ahram Al-Masry Al-Youm Al-Dostor Total
Al-Youm Al-Sabea'
0
20
28
31
79
Personal
0.0%
52.6%
56.0%
70.5%
56.8%
3
9
8
7
27
Protest
42.9%
23.7%
16.0%
15.9%
19.4%
0
1
6
1
8
Political meetings, press
conferences
0.0%
2.6%
12.0%
2.3%
5.8%
1
1
2
0
4
Elections, referendums
14.3%
2.6%
4.0%
0.0%
2.9%
0
3
0
0
3
Sit-in, strike
0.0%
7.9%
0.0%
0.0%
2.2%
2
1
0
0
3
Violence
28.6%
2.6%
0.0%
0.0%
2.2%
0
1
1
1
3
Military Vehicles
0.0%
2.6%
2.0%
2.3%
2.2%
0
0
3
0
3
Shrines and rituals
0.0%
0.0%
6.0%
0.0%
2.2%
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0
0.0%
0
Previous issue of the
Newspaper
0.0%
1
Other photos
14.3%
7
Total
100.0%
χ2 (42, N = 139) = 90.08, p = .00
Legislative bodies

0
0.0%
0
0.0%
2
5.2%
38
100.0%

0
0.0%
1
2.0%
1
2.0%
50
100.0%

2
4.5%
1
2.3%
1
2.3%
44
100.0%

2
1.4%
2
1.4%
5
3.5%
139
100.0%

Reference to Islamists
The newspapers used a variety of keywords to refer to Islamists. Only the first
mention of Islamists in the front-page news article was coded (starting with the headline,
sub-headline, then the lead and the rest of the article). The majority of the sampled frontpage news articles (65.5%, n = 129) referred to Islamic groups with their official names:
Party or movement official name like the MB/FJP, or personal political titles when
referring to people (See Figure 2). They also referred to them less but equally as ―the
Salafis‖ (10.2% (n = 20), or as ―Islamists, Islamic trends/forces/movements/groups, or
religious trends/forces‖ in 9.6% (n = 19).
A number of the news articles (8.2%, n = 16) referred to Islamists with labels
implying anti-democratic attitudes like exclusion and dictatorship including the MB
Guide rule or the MB state in 4.1% of the total sample (n = 8), the Brotherhoodization of
the state (1%, n = 2), the MB Constitution, and the MB‘s General Prosecutor with 0.5%
(n = 1) for each. This category also included a set of references to President Morsi
describing him as working only for the Brotherhood, like the MB‘s Morsi (1%, n = 2),
Morsi‘s Group and the MB representative in Presidency (0.5% , n = 1) for each. Most of
these references were used in Al-Dostor (11 out of 16), especially ―the Guide rule‖
(9.3%, n = 7).
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Two Al-Dostor articles used the term ―the Group‖ (1%, n = 2), which was the
name of a popular controversial TV show on the MB produced under Mubarak. AlDostor also referred to them with labels implying violence like ―the terrorist militia‖, ―the
hired MB‖; one news article for each. Another Al-Dostor article referred to Islamists as
―the darkness trend‖ (0.5%).
Three articles mentioned ―the MB youth or the Salafi Youth‖, one in each of AlAhram, Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘. In one instance a prominent Salafi
preacher was referred to as ―the highest commander of anti-revolution forces‖ in AlYoum Al-Sabea‘. Another Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ article referred to the Salafis as Ahl AsSunnah wa Al-Jamaʻah (Sunni Muslims), which was also used once in Al-Dostor.
Islamists were also referred to as ―the Majority trend‖ in one of Al-Dostor news stories.
Figure 2
Frequency of labels used with Islamic movements
MB's Morsi; 2%
Brotherhoodization; 2%
The Guide
Rule; 4%
Islamists; 10%

MB/Salafi youth;
2%

Other; 4%

Salafis; 10%

Official Name;
66%

Although differences in labels used to refer to Islamists among the four studied
newspapers were not statistically significant, χ2 (51, N = 197) = 55.42, p = .31 (See Table
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4), some telling differences were found. Al-Ahram was the most likely to be specific in
naming Islamists using their official name in 77.3% (n = 17) similar to Al-Masry AlYoum (71.1%, n = 32), then Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (61.8%, n = 34), and Al-Dostor (61.3%,
n = 46). Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ devoted considerable share of its Islamists‘ coverage to ―the
Salafis‖ in general, referring to them in 20% of its front-page news stories (n = 11),
followed by Al-Dostor which used the term in 8% (n = 6) of its sample. Al-Ahram didn‘t
use the term ―the Salafis‖ at all, preferring a specific reference to the covered Salafi party.
Al-Masry Al-Youm was the highest in using the label of ―Islamists, Islamic
trends/forces/groups, or religious trends/forces‖ (15.6%, n = 7) followed by Al-Ahram
(13.6%, n = 3), then Al-Dostor (8%, n = 6) and finally Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (5.5%, n = 3).
Al-Masry Al-Youm also used the labels ―the MB Guide rule‖ and ―Brotherhoodization of
the state‖ in one news story for each.
Table 4
Differences in reference to Islamists
Label
Al-Ahram
Official name
Salafis
Islamists, Islamic or
religious forces/trends
The Guide Rule
MB's Morsi/Morsi‘s
Group/ MB representative
in Presidency
Brotherhoodization, MB's

17
77.3%
0
0.0%
3
13.6%
0
0.0%
0

Newspaper
Total
Al-Masry Al-Youm
Al-Dostor
Al-Youm Al-Sabea'
32
34
46
129
71.1%
61.8%
61.3%
65.5%
3
11
6
20
6.7%
20.0%
8.0%
10.2%
7
3
6
19
15.6%
5.5%
8.0%
9.6%
1
0
7
8
2.2%
0.0%
9.3%
4.1%
0
1
3
4

0.0%

0.0%

1.8%

4%

2%

0

1

2

1

4
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General Prosecutor, MB
Constitution

0.0%

1
4.5%
0
Ahl As-sunnah w AlJama‘ah
0.0%
0
the Group
0.0%
0
Militia/s, Terrorist/s
0.0%
0
the Hired
0.0%
0
The Darkness Trend
0.0%
0
The highest commander of
anti-revolution forces
0.0%
0
The Majority‘s trend
0.0%
1
MB Lawyers
4.5%
45
Total
100.0%
χ2 (51, N = 197) = 55.42, p = .31
MB youth/Salafi Youth

2.2%

3.6%

1.3%

2%

1
2.2%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
55
100.0%

1
1.8%
1
1.8%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
1
1.8%
1
1.8%
0
0.0%
75
100.0%

0
0.0%
1
1.3%
2
2.7%
1
1.3%
1
1.3%
1
1.3%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
197
100.0%

3
1.5%
2
1.0%
2
1.0%
1
0.5%
1
0.5%
1
0.5%
1
0.5%
1
0.5%
1
0.5%
45
100.0%

Reference to Opponents of Islamists
Islamists opponents were mentioned in 66% (n = 130) of the sampled news stories
on Islamists. Al-Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm were more likely to mention Islamists
opponents with (72%, n = 16) and (71.1%, n = 32) of their articles respectively. Al-Youm
Al-Sabea‘ also mentioned Islamists‘ opponents in 63.6% (n = 35) of its articles, a little
more than Al-Dostor (62.7%, n = 47). Such differences were not statistically significant,
χ2 (3, N = 197) = 1.48, p = .69.
The sampled news papers employed a variety of labels when referring to Islamists
opponents (See Figure 3). Only the first occurring label was coded. Among the front-page
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news stories that mentioned opponent of Islamists (N = 130), a total of 40.8% (n = 53)
referred to them with their official names: Party or movement official name or official
political title. They were also frequently referred to as ―revolutionary groups, youth or
youth movements‖ in 11.5% (n = 15), as ―political forces‖ in 9.2% (n = 12), as
―protestors/the square‖ in 6.2% (n = 8), and as ―civil forces/trends‖ in 5.4% (n = 7).
Professional titles were used to label Islamists opponents in 6.2% (n = 8) of the articles,
including ―experts‖ 3.1% (n = 4), ―lawyer/s‖ (2.3%, n = 3), and ―workers‖ (0.8%, n = 1).
Other labels appeared less frequently like ―the Church/Coptic/Copts in Diaspora‖ 3.1% (n
=4), and ―the people, citizens, or residents‖ (2.3%, n = 3). Each of the following labels
appeared twice (1.5%, n = 2) in the total sampled stories that mentioned opponents of
Islamists: ―national forces‖, ―remnants of Mubarak regime or NDP candidates‖, ―Sufis‖,
―Leftists and Liberals‖, and ―judges clubs‖. Some labels appeared once including: ―public
figures‖, ―the SCAF‖, ―the Advisory Council‖, ―State security police‖, ―ex-Brotherhood
members‖, ―Member of Parliament‖, ―Sinai Tribes‖ and ―unidentified people‖.
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Figure 3
Frequency of labels used with Islamists’ opponents

People,
citizens; 2%

Official Name;
40%
Other; 18%

Copts; 3%
Professions; 6%

Civil forces; 5%
Protestors; 6%
Revolutionary/
youth; 11%

Political forces;
9%

No significant difference was found among the four newspapers in their use of
references to opponents of Islamists, χ2 (72, N = 130) = 74.59, p = .4. However, some
categories were preferred more than others in each of the newspapers sampled (See Table
5). The official name was the most repeated reference to Islamists‘ opponents in all four
newspapers, but Al-Ahram was more likely to use it (68.8%, n = 11), followed by AlYoum Al-Sabea‘ (45.7%, n = 16), then Al-Masry Al-Youm (37.5%, n = 12) and AlDostor (29.8%, n = 14). Al-Masry Al-Youm also named Islamists‘ opponents as
―revolutionaries or youth movements‖ in 21.9% (n = 7) of the articles followed by AlDostor in 10.6% (n = 5) and Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (8.6%, n = 3), while Al-Ahram never
used the term. ―Protestors‖ was also used in 12.5% of Al-Masry Al-Youm stories (n = 4),
far more than the three other newspapers. On the contrary, opponents of Islamists were
referred to as ―political forces‖ in 25% of Al-Ahram sample (n = 4), and 11.4% of AlYoum Al-Sabea‘ sample (n = 4).
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Table 5
Differences in reference to Islamists’ opponents
Label
Newspaper
Al-Ahram Al-Masry Al- Al-Youm Al- Al-Dostor
Youm
Sabea'
11
12
16
14
Official names
68.8%
37.5%
45.7%
29.8%
0
7
3
5
Revolutionary or Youth
groups/forces/movements
0.0%
21.9%
8.6%
10.6%
4
1
4
3
Political forces
25.0%
3.1%
11.4%
6.4%
0
4
1
3
Protestors
0.0%
12.5%
2.9%
6.4%
0
3
2
2
Civil Trends, forces
0.0%
9.4%
5.7%
4.3%
0
0
3
1
The Church/ Copts in
Diaspora
0.0%
0.0%
8.6%
2.1%
0
0
1
3
Experts
0.0%
0.0%
2.9%
6.4%
0
0
0
3
Lawyer
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
6.4%
0
1
0
2
The People, Citizens,
Residents
0.0%
3.1%
0.0%
4.3%
0
0
2
0
Leftists and Liberals
0.0%
0.0%
5.7%
0.0%
1
0
1
0
Judges clubs
6.2%
0.0%
2.9%
0.0%
0
0
0
2
National forces
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
4.3%
0
1
1
0
Sufis
0.0%
3.1%
2.9%
0.0%
0
1
0
1
Remnants of Mubarak
regime, NDP Candidates
0.0%
3.1%
0.0%
2.1%
0
0
0
1
Workers
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
2.1%
0
1
0
0
Public Figures
0.0%
3.1%
0.0%
0.0%
0
1
1
2
Other
0
02.1%
2.9%
14.9%
Total
16
32
35
47
χ2 (72, N = 130) = 74.59, p = .4
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Total

53
40.8%
15
11.5%
12
9.2%
8
6.2%
7
5.4%
4
3.1%
4
3.1%
3
2.3%
3
2.3%
2
1.5%
2
1.5%
2
1.5%
2
1.5%
2
1.5%
1
0.8%
1
0.8%
9
6.9%
130

Sourcing
Sources that were quoted or cited in front-page news stories on Islamists were
coded into three groups: Islamist, neutral, anti-Islamist sources. The decision to
participate in June 30, 2013 protests was the criterion used in sources‘ classification;
those who announced they would participate were considered ―anti-Islamists‖, those who
didn‘t declare a clear position were categorized as ―neutral‖ which also included
government officials if they were technocrats and not politicians, citizens, and
eyewitnesses, while Islamist sources are the groups previously specified in the study.
Some news articles quoted or paraphrased more than one of the categories of sources,
while other articles didn‘t cite any source at all.
More than half of front-page news articles on Islamists didn‘t quote or paraphrase
them. They were quoted in (47.7%) of the articles (n = 94). Differences among the four
sampled newspapers in quoting Islamist sources were found to be statistically significant,
χ2 (3, N = 197) = 13.84, p = .003 (See Table 6). Al-Masry Al-Youm was the highest
among the four newspapers with 64.4% (n = 29) of its articles including quotes or
paraphrasing from Islamists sources, followed by Al-Ahram (59.1%, n = 13), then AlYoum Al-Sabea‘ (50.9%, n = 28). Islamists‘ voice was overshadowed in Al-Dostor with
only 32% (n = 24) of its news stories on Islamists actually quoting or citing them.
More than half of the sampled news stories cited anti-Islamist sources (52.2%, n =
103), compared to 47.7% (n = 94) that cited Islamist sources. Differences among
newspapers were not statistically significant, χ2 (3, N = 197) =.82, p = .85 (See Table 6).
Al-Masry Al-Youm quoted or cited anti-Islamist sources much more than the other
papers (57.8%, n = 26). Al-Dostor also cited anti-Islamist sources in 52% (n = 39) of
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their articles. Half of Al- Ahram sample cited anti-Islamist sources (50%, n = 11), similar
to Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (49.1%, n = 27).
Neutral sources were the least quoted or paraphrased among the four sampled
newspapers. A total of 36.5% (n = 72) of the sample quoted neutral sources in their frontpage news stories dealing with Islamists. But differences among the four sampled
newspapers were statistically significant, χ2 (3, N = 197) = 9.45, p = .02 (See Table 6).
Al-Masry Al-Youm sample was more likely to quote neutral sources (55.6%, n = 25),
much more than Al-Ahram (36.4%, n = 8), Al-Dostor (30.7%, n = 23), and Al-Youm AlSabea‘ (29.1%, n = 16).
Table 6
Frequency of sources quoted or paraphrased in news articles on Islamists
Source
Al-Ahram
Al-Masry
Al-Youm
Al-Dostor
Al-Youm
Al-Sabea'
Anti-Islamists
11
26
27
39
50%
57.8%
49.1%
52%
Islamists
13
29
28
24
59.1%
64.4%
50.9%
32%
Neutral
8
25
16
23
36.4%
55.6%
29.1%
30.7%

Total
103
52.3%
94
47.7%
72
36.5%

Coverage Direction towards Islamists
The Muslim Brotherhood/Freedom and Justice Party
Of the 156 news stories that mentioned the MB/FJP in the sample, a total of
55.8% (n = 87) viewed them negatively, compared to 41% (n = 64) neutrally, and only
3.2% (n = 5) positively (See Table 8, Figure 4).
Statistically significant differences were found among the four newspapers in
their coverage tone towards the Muslim Brotherhood, χ2 (6, N = 156) = 40.24, p = .00
(See Table 7). Al-Dostor coverage tone of the MB was overwhelmingly negative (81.4%,
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n = 48). Almost half of Al-Masry Al-Youm front-page news stories covered the
Brotherhood negatively (51.3%, n = 20), more than neutrally (41%, n = 16). Al-Ahram
was more likely to cover them in a neutral way (90%, n = 18). Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘
covered them neutrally (52.6%, n = 20) slightly more than negatively (44.7%, n = 17). No
news story was positive towards the MB/FJP in Al-Ahram, only one was found in each of
Al-Dostor and Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘, while Al-Masry Al-Youm was the highest among the
four papers to cover then positively in 7.7% (n = 3) of its articles.
Table 7
Differences among newspapers in coverage direction towards the MB/FJP
Direction
Newspaper
Total
Al-Ahram
Positive

0
0.0%
Neutral
18
90.0%
Negative
2
10.0%
Total
20
χ2 (6, N = 156) = 40.24, p = .00

Al-Masry
Al-Youm
3
7.7%
16
41.0%
20
51.3%
39

Al-Youm
Al-Sabea'
1
2.6%
20
52.6%
17
44.7%
38

Al-Dostor
1
1.7%
10
16.9%
48
81.4%
59

5
3.2%
64
41.0%
87
55.8%
156

The Salafi Call/Al-Noor Party
A total of 20.3% (n = 40) front-page news articles referred to the Salafi Call or its
political wing Al-Noor Party. Coverage tone was neutral in around two thirds (65%, n =
26) of these news articles (See Table 8, Figure 4). The rest (35%, n = 14) viewed the
Salafi Call or Al-Noor party in a negative manner. No single article was found to be
favorable towards the Salafi Call or its Al-Noor party.
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Data analysis revealed no statistically significant difference among the four
studied newspapers in their coverage tone towards the Salafi Call or its Al-Noor party, χ2
(3, N = 40) = 6.67, p = .08. But some considerable differences can be highlighted. AlAhram news articles mentioning the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party were all neutral. Al-Youm
Al-Sabea‘ was far more neutral (62.5%, n = 5) than negative (37.5%, n = 3). On the
contrary, around half of the news articles in Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Dostor was
negative (56.2%, n = 9) and (50%, n = 3) respectively, and the other half was neutral.
Other Salafi parties and movements
A total of 80% (n = 9) of the 11 news articles that mentioned Salafi parties and
movements like Al-Asala, Al-Fadila, Al-Watan and the Salafi Front were neutral with
only 2 news stories viewing them negatively, and they were never covered in a positive
tone in the studied sample (See Table 8, Figure 4). Differences between the sampled
newspapers were not statistically significant, χ2 (3, N = 11) = 4.28, p = .23. Al-Ahram,
Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ were all neutral in covering Salafi parties
and movements other than the Salafi Call/Al-Noor, compared to Al-Dostor with half of
its front-page news articles on them being negative (50%, n = 2), and the other half
neutral.
Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya or Al-Bena’ w Al-Tanmia party
Front-page news stories that referred to Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya or its political
party Al-Bena‘ w Al-Tanmia were neutral (54.5%, n = 12) slightly more than negative
(40.9%, n = 9). Of the total 22 (11.2%, N = 197) news stories that covered Al-Gama‘a
Al-Islamiyya, only one viewed them positively (See Table 8, Figure 4). No statistically
significant differences were found between the sampled newspapers in their tone towards
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Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya or its political party, χ2 (6, N = 22) = 5.46, p = .49. But 75% of
the news articles in Al-Masry Al-Youm approached Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya negatively
(n = 3). Half of Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ articles was negative (50%, n = 3) and the other half
was neutral. Al-Ahram was the opposite with most of its articles (80%, n = 4) neutral
towards Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya, while Al-Dostor articles was primarily neutral (57.1%,
n = 4) then negative (28.6%, n = 2). The only news story that represented Al-Gama‘a AlIslamiyya positively was also found in Al-Dostor.
Abu Ismail supporters/Al-Raya Party
The dominant coverage tone towards the supporters of Hazem Abu Ismail
supporters, the disqualified presidential candidate, or his Al-Raya Party, was negative. A
total of 83.3% (n = 5) of the 6 front-page news articles that referred to them viewed them
unfavorably (See Table 8, Figure 4). The only news story that viewed them neutrally was
found in Al-Ahram, while a positive tone towards them was completely absent in all
sampled articles. No statistically significant differences were found between the four
newspaper in this regard, χ2 (3, N = 6) = 2.4, p = .49.
Al-Wasat Party
Compared to other Islamists, Al-Wasat was covered differently. Unlike other
Islamists, the party was not viewed unfavorably in any of the sampled news articles (See
Table 8, Figure 4). Despite being only mentioned in 4% (n = 8) of the sampled news
stories, coverage tone was more neutral (62.5%, n = 5) than positive (37.5%, n = 3).
Statistically significant difference among studied papers were not found, χ2 (2, N = 8) =
2.31, p = .32. Al-Dostor never mentioned Al-Wasat in its news article on Islamists,
suggesting that it might have defined it as a non-Islamist party. Al-Ahram articles on Al87

Wasat were all neutral (n = 2), while Al-Masry Al-Youm was more positive than neutral,
but with slight differences (2 to 1 article). Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ covered Al-Wasat
neutrally in 2 articles and positively in one article.
Only one article in Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ referred to Al-Haya al-Shariyya lil-Haquq
wa-l Islah, and it was covered negatively.
Islamists in general
A total of 31% (n = 61) of the sampled 197 front-page news stories referred to
Islamists in general (including general reference to the Salafis without specifying a
certain Salafi party or group). Among these news articles, Islamists in general were
primarily covered in a negative tone (62.3%, n = 38) far more than being covered
neutrally (36.1%, n = 22, See Table 8, Figure 4). Only one article referred to Islamists
positively, and again it was in Al-Masry Al-Youm. The differences between the four
sampled papers were not statistically significant, χ2 (6, N = 61) = 5.45, p = .49. Al-Dostor
came first in covering Islamists negatively with 70.6% (n = 12) of its articles on them,
closely followed by Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (69.6%, n = 16). Al-Masry Al-Youm articles
were almost divided between negative and neutral coverage. Half of its front-page news
articles covered them negatively (50%, n = 8) and 43.8% (n = 7) approached them
neutrally. Al-Ahram was more neutral in covering Islamists with 60% (n = 3) of its frontpage news articles, while the rest of its articles (40%, n = 2) covered them negatively.
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Table 8
Frequency of coverage tone towards each of the cited Islamic group
Islamic Group
Negative
Neutral
Positive
MB/FJP
87
64
5
55.8%
41%
3.2%
The Islamists or The
38
22
1
Salafis
62.3%
36.1%
1.6%
The Salafi Call/Al-Noor
13
27
0
32.5%
67.5%
0
Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya
9
12
1
40.9%
54.5%
4.5%
Other Salafi groups
2
9
0
18.2%
81.8%
0
Al-Wasat Party
0
5
3
0
62.5%
37.5%
Abu Ismail Supporters
5
1
0
83.3%
16.7%
0
Al-Haya al-Shariyya lil1
0
0
Haquq wa-l Islah
100%
0
0
Figure 4
Frequency of coverage tone towards each of the cited Islamic movements
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Dominant frames in covering Islamists
Frames associated with negative implications were more dominant in covering
Islamists, while more neutral frames were less observed (See Figure 5). Islamic
movements and parties were mainly framed through the ―anti-democracy‖ (23.4%, n =
46), ―political organization‖ (13.2%, n = 26), ―violence‖ (11.2%, n = 22), ―polarization‖
(10.2%, n = 20), and ―anti-revolution‖ (9.6%, n = 19). Less frequently used were the
―reconciliation‖ (7.6%, n = 15), ―hypocrisy‖ (7.1%, n= 14), ―anti-modernity‖ (6.1%, n =
12), ―internal conflict‖ (5.6%, n = 11), ―conspiracy‖ (3.6%, n = 7), and ―victims of
Mubarak and State Security‖ (2.5%, n = 5) frames.
Figure 5
Dominant frames used with Islamic movements
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13%
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10%
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Significant differences were found between the four sampled newspapers in the
frames they used when covering Islamists, χ2 (30, N = 197) = 46.4, p = .028 (See Table
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9). Al-Dostor and Al-Masry Al-Youm were the highest among the four newspapers to
frame Islamists as ―anti-democracy‖. A total of 30.7% (n = 23) news articles in Al-Dostor
and 24.4% (n = 11) in Al-Masry Al-Youm framed Islamists as such, followed by AlAhram in 22.7% (n = 5) of its articles and finally came Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ with 12.7%
(n = 7). Around fourth of Al-Ahram front-page news articles (27.3%, n = 6) framed
Islamists as ―politically organized‖, followed by Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (16.4%, n = 9), then
Al-Masry Al-Youm (11.1%, n = 5) and Al-Dostor (8%, n = 6). Al-Dostor was also more
likely to frame Islamists as ―violent‖ in 16% (n =12) of its articles, followed by Al-Youm
Al-Sabea‘ (9.1%, n = 5) then Al-Masry Al-Youm (8.9%, n = 4). Only one of Al-Ahram
articles framed them as violent. The ―polarization‖ frame prevailed in Al-Ahram with
27.3% (n = 6) of it articles. It was also used frequently in Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (16.4%, n
= 9), but less used in Al-Masry Al-Youm (6.7%, n = 3) or Al-Dostor (2.7%, n = 2). After
the ―anti-democracy‖ frame, Al-Masry Al-Youm was more likely to frame Islamists as
―anti-revolution‖ in 15.6% (n = 7) of the articles, followed by Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘
(10.9%, n = 6) then Al-Dostor (8%, n = 6).
The ―reconciliation‖ frame was less observed, with Al-Masry Al-Youm using it in
11.1% (n = 5) of the articles, followed closely by Al-Ahram (9.1%, n = 2) and Al-Youm
Al-Sabea‘ (7.3%, n = 4) then Al-Dostor (5.3%, n = 4). Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ was also
more likely than the other newspapers to frame Islamists as ―anti-modernity‖ in 10.9% (n
=6) of the articles, followed by Al-Masry Al-Youm (6.7%, n = 3) then Al-Dostor (4%, n
= 3). Al-Ahram was the highest among the four studied papers to use the ―internal
conflict‖ frame in 9.1% (n = 2) of its articles, followed by Al-Youm Al-Sabea (5.5%, n =
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3) then Al-Dostor (5.3%, n = 4). Al-Dostor and Al- Masry Al-Youm framed Islamists as
―hypocrites‖ in 12% (n = 9), and 8.9% (n = 4) of their articles respectively.
Table 9
Difference in framing Islamists among newspapers
Frame
Newspaper
Al-Ahram
Al-Masry
Al-Youm
Al-Dostor
Al-Youm
Al-Sabea'
(Least
(Moderate
(Minimum
(High
Violations) Violations) Violations) Violations)
5
11
7
23
Anti-democracy
22.7%
24.4%
12.7%
30.7%
6
5
9
6
Political organization
27.3%
11.1%
16.4%
8.0%
1
4
5
12
Violence
4.5%
8.9%
9.1%
16.0%
6
3
9
2
Polarization
27.3%
6.7%
16.4%
2.7%
0
7
6
6
Anti-revolution
0.0%
15.6%
10.9%
8.0%
2
5
4
4
Reconciliation
9.1%
11.1%
7.3%
5.3%
0
4
1
9
Hypocrisy
0.0%
8.9%
1.8%
12.0%
0
3
6
3
Anti-modernity/threat
to Egyptian culture
0.0%
6.7%
10.9%
4.0%
2
2
3
4
Internal Conflict
9.1%
4.4%
5.5%
5.3%
0
1
3
3
Conspiracy/treason
0.0%
2.2%
5.5%
4.0%
0
0
2
3
Victims of Mubarak,
and state security
0.0%
0.0%
3.6%
4.0%
22
45
55
75
Total
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
χ2 (30, N = 197) = 46.4, p = .028

92

Total

46
23.4%
26
13.2%
22
11.2%
20
10.2%
19
9.6%
15
7.6%
14
7.1%
12
6.1%
11
5.6%
7
3.6%
5
2.5%
197
100.0%

Framing the MB/FJP
Significant differences were found between the frames used when the Muslim
Brotherhood or their Freedom and Justice Party was mentioned, χ2 (10, N = 197) = 27.84,
p = .00 (See Table 10). Of the total (79.2%, n = 156) articles citing the MB/FJP, the
dominant frames used were anti-democracy (26.3%, n = 41), political organization
(14.1%, n = 22), anti-revolution (10.9%, n = 17), polarization (10.9%, n = 17), hypocrisy
(8.3%, n = 13), violence (7.7%, n = 12), reconciliation (7.1%, n = 11), internal conflict
(5.1%, n = 8), conspiracy/treason (4.5%, n = 7), and anti-modernity (3.8%, n = 6).
Table 10
Differences in frames used when the MB/FJP are mentioned
Frame
MB/FJP mentioned
Yes
No
41
5
Anti-democracy
26.3%
12.2%
22
4
Politically organized
14.1%
9.8%
17
3
Polarization
10.9%
7.3%
17
2
Anti-revolution
10.9%
4.9%
13
1
Hypocrisy
8.3%
2.4%
12
10
Violence
7.7%
24.4%
11
4
Reconciliation
7.1%
9.8%
8
3
Internal conflict
5.1%
7.3%
7
0
Conspiracy/treason
4.5%
0.0%
6
6
Anti-modernity/threat to Egyptian
culture
3.8%
14.6%
93

Victims of Mubarak & state
security
Total
χ2 (10, N = 197) = 27.84, p = .00

2
1.3%
156

3
7.3%
41

Chi square results didn‘t indicate a statistical significance difference between the
studied newspapers in the frames used to cover the MB/FJP, χ2 (30, N = 156) = 42.6, p =
.064. But some indicative differences existed. A total of 37.7% of Al-Dostor articles
framed the MB as ―anti-democracy‖, followed by 23.1% (n = 9) in Al-Masry Al-Youm,
20% (n = 4) in Al-Ahram, and 15.8% in Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘. Al-Ahram was more likely
to frame the MB as ―politically organized‖ (30%, n = 6), far more than Al-Youm AlSabea‘ (15.8%, n = 6), and Al-Masry Al-Youm (12.8%, n = 5). The same pattern
appeared with the ―polarization‖ frame which used more in Al-Ahram (30%¸ n = 6), then
Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ (15.8%, n = 6). Al-Masry Al-Youm was more likely than the three
other newspapers to view the MB as ―anti-revolution‖ in 17.9% of its articles (n = 7),
followed by 10.5% in Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ and 10.2% in Al-Dostor. The latter was more
likely than the other papers to frame the MB as hypocrites in 13.6% (n = 8) of the
articles, followed by Al-Masry Al-Youm (10.3%, n = 4). Half of the articles framing the
MB as violent were also found in Al-Dostor (10.2%, n = 6).
Framing the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party
Significant differences were found in the frames employed when the Salafi Call
and its Al-Noor party were mentioned, χ2 (10, N = 197) = 29.27, p = .00 (See Table 11).
In the total 40 (20.3% N = 197) articles that mentioned the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party,
they were predominantly framed through the more neutral ―politically organized‖ and
―polarization‖ frames with 20% of the articles for each (n = 8), ―anti-democracy‖ and
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―Internal conflict‖ with 17.5% of the articles for each (n = 7), the ―reconciliation‖ frame
(10%, n = 4), and the ―anti-revolution‖ frame (5%, n = 2). Conspiracy frame was never
used with the Salafi Call/Al-Noor. And only one article appeared for each of the
following frames: violence, hypocrisy, victims of Mubarak regime, and anti-modernity
frames.
Table 11
Difference in frames used with the Salafi Call/Al-Noor Party
Frame
The Salafi Call/AlNoor mentioned
Yes
No
8
18
Politically organized
20.0%
11.5%
8
12
Polarization
20.0%
7.6%
7
39
Anti-democracy
17.5%
24.8%
7
4
Internal conflict
17.5%
2.5%
4
11
Reconciliation
10.0%
7.0%
2
17
Anti-revolution
5.0%
10.8%
1
11
Anti-modernity/threat to Egyptian
culture
2.5%
7.0%
1
21
Violence
2.5%
13.4%
1
13
Hypocrisy
2.5%
8.3%
0
7
Conspiracy
0.0%
4.5%
1
4
Victims of Mubarak, & state
security
2.5%
2.5%
Total
40
157
χ2 (10, N = 197) = 29.27, p = .00
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Differences between the four studied newspapers in the frames used to cover the
Salafi Call or Al-Noor party were not statistically significant, χ2 (27, N = 40) = 35.82, p =
.119. However, Al-Ahram was more likely to use the ―polarization‖ frame when citing
the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party with 40% (n = 4) of the articles, followed by Al-Masry AlYoum (18.8%, n = 3). On the contrary, Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ was more likely to view the
Salafi Call as ―politically organized‖ in 37.5% of its articles on them (n = 3), followed by
Al-Dostor (33.3%, n = 2), then Al-Ahram (20%, n = 2). Al-Masry Al-Youm covered
them as ―politically organized‖ in one article only. Al-Masry Al-Youm was the highest
among the three newspapers in framing the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party as ―antidemocracy‖ with 37.5% (n = 6) of the articles, twice as framing them through the
―reconciliation‖ frame (18.8%, n = 3), while Al-Dostor was more likely to focus on the
―internal conflict‖ when covering the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party (33.3%, n = 2).
Dominant frames used with other Islamist movements and parties
Framing differed significantly when Salafi parties and movements other than the
Salafi Call/Al-Noor party were mentioned, χ2 (10, N = 197) = 18.22, p = .05 (See Table
14). Al-Asala, Al-Fadila, Al-Watan parties and the Salafi Front were more framed using
the ―polarization‖ (36.4%, n = 4) and the ―reconciliation‖ (18.2%, n = 2) frames.
There were no statistically significant differences in using certain frames when
Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya or its Al-Bena‘ w Al-Tanmia party was mentioned, χ2 (10, N =
197) = 11.2, p = .34 (See Table 14). Polarization frame was more used when Al- Gama‘a
Al-Islamiyya was mentioned with 27.3% (n = 6) of the articles, followed by the antidemocracy frame in 18.2% (n = 4), then the anti-revolution and the violence frames with
13.6% (n = 3) for each.
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No significant differences among frames were found when Al-Wasat was
mentioned, χ2 (10, N = 197) = 14.65, p = .15 (See Table 14). Of the total 4.1% (n = 8)
articles that mentioned them, they were viewed through a ―politically organized‖ frame in
37.5% of the articles (n = 3), and ―internal conflict‖ frame in 25% of the articles (n = 2).
Statistically significant differences were found in frames used when Abu Ismail
supporters or his Al-Raya Party were mentioned, χ2 (10, N = 197) = 18.14, p = .05 (See
Table 14). In the 6 articles that mentioned them, two used the polarization frame (33.3%)
and another two used the internal conflict frame (33.3%).
Framing Islamists and the Salafis when mentioned in general
When the Islamists in general (including the Salafis in general) were mentioned,
certain frames appeared more than others, and differences were statistically significant,
χ2 (10, N = 197) = 23.12, p = .01 (See Table 14). Of the 61 (31%, N = 197) articles that
referred to Islamists or the Salafis in general with or without specifying a certain Islamic
movement, anti-democracy and polarization frames came first with 18% (n = 11) and
16.4% (n = 10) respectively, followed by violence (14.8%, n = 9), anti-revolution (13.1%,
n = 8), and anti-modernity frames (11.5%, n = 7).
Frames and newspaper ownership type
There is a statistically significant differences between the sampled state-owned
newspaper (Al-Ahram) and the private newspapers (Al-Masry Al-Youm, Al-Youm AlSabea‘ and Al-Dostor) in the frames they employed when covering Islamists, χ2 (30, N =
197) = 19.63, p = .03 (See Table 12). Both types of newspapers ownership used the antidemocracy frame almost equally with 23.4% (n = 41) for the private outlets and 22.7% (n
= 5) for the state-owned newspaper. The state-owned newspaper was more likely to use
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the ―politically organized‖ frame and the ―polarization‖ frame with 27.3% (n = 6) of its
articles on Islamists for each. This was more than double the percentage found in private
newspapers for the ―politically organized‖ frame (11.4%, n = 20), and the ―polarization‖
frame (8%, n = 14). On the contrary, private newspapers were far more likely to use the
violence frame (12%, n = 21) compared to 4.5% (n = 1) in the state-owned outlet. AlAhram used the ―internal conflict‖ frame (9.1%, n = 2) more than the private newspapers
(5.1%, n = 9). The same with the ―reconciliation‖ frame with 9.1% (n = 2) in Al-Ahram
compared to 7.4% (n = 13) in private newspapers.
Some frames were exclusively used by private newspapers and didn‘t appear in
the state-owned outlet including the anti-revolution, conspiracy, anti-modernity,
hypocrisy, and victims of Mubarak regime.
Table 12
Differences in frames according to newspaper ownership type
Frame
Ownership Type
Total
State
Private
5
41
46
Anti-democracy
22.7%
23.4%
23.4%
6
20
26
Politically organized
27.3%
11.4%
13.2%
1
21
22
Violence Frame
4.5%
12.0%
11.2%
6
14
20
Polarization
27.3%
8.0%
10.2%
0
19
19
Anti-revolution
0.0%
10.9%
9.6%
2
13
15
Reconciliation
9.1%
7.4%
7.6%
0
14
14
Hypocrisy
0.0%
8.0%
7.1%
Anti-modernity
0
12
12
98

0.0%
2
Internal conflict
9.1%
0
Conspiracy
0.0%
0
Victims of Mubarak &
state security
0.0%
22
Total
100.0%
χ2 (30, N = 197) = 19.63, p = .03

6.9%
9
5.1%
7
4.0%
5
2.9%
175
100.0%

6.1%
11
5.6%
7
3.6%
5
2.5%
197
100.0%

Frames and level of media professionalism
The sampled newspapers varied in their level in professional and ethical practices
as classified by the Supreme Press Council in Egypt (Hamada, Al-Ghaly, Al-Azrak, &
Fikry, 2013). Significant differences were found between the newspapers classified
according to their level of commitment to journalism standards in the frames they used
when covering Islamists, χ2 (30, N = 197) = 46.4, p = .028 (See Table 9, Figure 6). The
more the newspaper is committed to ethical and professional standards, the more it is
likely to use analytical frames in its coverage of Islamists. The frames most used with
Islamists in the newspaper of the least violations (Al-Ahram) were ―polarization‖ and
―political organization‖ equally with 27.3% (n = 6) article for each, followed by the ―antidemocracy‖ frame (22.7%, n = 5). The same was with the next category which showed
slightly more violations of press standards but remains in the less violators (Al-Youm AlSabea‘) which framed Islamists mainly through a ―polarization‖ and ―political
organization‖ frames with 16.4% of articles for each (n = 9) slightly more than the ―antidemocracy‖ frame 12.7% (n = 7). Negative frames were more dominant than analytical
frames in the newspaper of moderate violations (Al-Masry Al-Youm) including ―anti-

99

democracy‖ 24.4% (n = 11), ―anti-revolution‖ (15.6%, n = 7), then ―political
organization‖ and ―reconciliation‖ in 11.1% or 5 article for each. The highest newspaper
in violating professional and ethical standards (Al-Dostor) was far more likely to use
negative frames in covering Islamists than the three other papers with the ―antidemocracy‖ frame in 30.7% (n = 23) of its articles, followed by the ―violence‖ frame in
16% (n = 12), and ―hypocrisy‖ frame in 12% (n = 9).
Figure 6
Framing by newspaper level of professionalism
35%
Most Committed

30%

Minimum Violations
25%

Moderate Violations

20%

Least Committed

15%
10%
5%
0%

Dominant frames and roles of Islamists
The time frame of the study was categorized into four periods of significant
change in the roles played by Islamic movements and parties in political life. The first
period is between the March 2011 constitutional referendums, seen by many as the
beginning of the rift between Islamists and seculars, and until before the parliamentary
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elections (from February 12 – November 27, 2011). Islamists acted as opposition to the
SCAF that was ruling the country during that period. The second period includes the
parliamentary elections in which Islamists won a majority, and lasts until the beginning
of the presidential elections (from November 28, 2011 – May 22, 2012). The third period
consists of the six first months in President Morsi tenure where Islamists reached
executive power for the first time, and end before he issued the Constitutional
Declaration (from May 23 – November 22, 2012). The last period extends from the
Constitutional Declaration which consolidated the President‘s power until the second
anniversary of January 25th revolution which mark the end of the study‘s time frame
(from November 22, 2012 to February 12, 2013), this period also include the referendum
on and approval of the constitution.
Frames used by Egyptian newspapers differed significantly between the four
specified periods, χ2 (30, N = 197) = 76.35, p = .00 (See Table 13, Figure 7). Before
Islamists had a majority in parliament, they were largely framed as politically organized
(20.4%, n = 10), violent (16.3%, n = 8), anti-modernity (16.3%, n = 8) and antidemocracy (12.2%, n = 6). After they gained a majority in parliament and in addition to
the political organization frame, two other frames appeared powerfully: the antirevolution (15%, n = 9) and the reconciliation (16.7%, n = 10). After the election of
President Morsi and dissolving of the People‘s Assembly (lower house of parliament), the
anti-democracy frame was the most used (41.5%, n = 22), followed by other negative
frames including hypocrisy (13.2%, n = 7) and violence (11.3%, n = 6). This continued
after President Morsi issued the Constitutional Declaration on November 22, 2012. From
this date until the second anniversary of the revolution, the prevailing frame was anti101

democracy (40%, n = 14), other frames like violence, anti-revolution and polarization
also appeared frequently but far less than anti-democracy with 14.3% (n = 5) of the
articles for each.
Table 13
Differences in frames according to change in political role of Islamists
Frame
Periods
Before
From
From
After
Parliamentary Parliamentary Presidential Constitutional
elections
till before
elections till
Declaration
Presidential
before
till Feb 11,
elections
Constitutional
2013
Declaration
6
4
22
14
Antidemocracy
12.2%
6.7%
41.5%
40.0%
10
12
4
0
Politically
organized
20.4%
20.0%
7.5%
0.0%
8
3
6
5
Violence
16.3%
5.0%
11.3%
14.3%
4
6
5
5
Polarization
8.2%
10.0%
9.4%
14.3%
4
9
1
5
Antirevolution
8.2%
15.0%
1.9%
14.3%
1
10
2
2
Reconciliation
2.0%
16.7%
3.8%
5.7%
1
4
7
2
Hypocrisy
2.0%
6.7%
13.2%
5.7%
8
2
1
1
Antimodernity
16.3%
3.3%
1.9%
2.9%
3
4
3
1
Internal
conflict
6.1%
6.7%
5.7%
2.9%
3
2
2
0
Conspiracy/tre
ason
6.1%
3.3%
3.8%
0.0%
1
4
0
0
Victims of
Mubarak
2.0%
6.7%
0.0%
0.0%
Total
49
60
53
35
χ2 (30, N = 197) = 76.35, p = .00
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Total

46
23.4%
26
13.2%
22
11.2%
20
10.2%
19
9.6%
15
7.6%
14
7.1%
12
6.1%
11
5.6%
7
3.6%
5
2.5%
197

Figure 7
Framing through time for the top five frames
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Difference in framing different Islamic movements
The Muslim Brotherhood and their Freedom and Justice Party were framed
different than the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party (See Table 14, Figure 8). The MB/FJP were
far more framed as anti-democracy (26.3%, n = 41) than the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party
(17.5%, n = 7). Also as anti-revolution almost twice as the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party,
with 10.9% (n = 17) for MB compared to 5% for the Salafi Call/Al-Noor Party (n = 2).
On the contrary, the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party was more framed through the political
organization and polarization frames in 20% of the articles (n = 8) for each, compared to
14.1% (n = 22) and 10.9% (n = 17) respectively for the MB. The Salafi Call/Al-Noor
party were also more framed using the internal conflict frame with 17.5% of the articles
(n = 7) compared to 5.1% (n = 8) in the case of the MB. The reconciliation frame was
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also more used with the Salafi Call/Al-Noor (10%, n = 4) compared to (7.1%, n = 11) for
the MB.
Conspiracy frame was never used with the Salafi Call/Al-Noor while used in
4.5% (n = 7) of articles on MB. Only one article used each of the following frames for the
Salafi Call/Al-Noor: violence, hypocrisy, victims of Mubarak regime, and anti-modernity
frames, far less than the MB which was frequently represented using the frames of
hypocrisy (8.3%, n = 13), and violence (7.7%, n = 12).
Table 14
Frequency of frames used with each Islamist group
Frame
Islamic Movement or Party
MB/FJP Islamists Al-Noor Al-Gama‘a
Other Al-Wasat
or Salafis
AlSalafi
in general
Islamiyya
Groups
41
11
7
4
1
0
Anti-democracy
26.3%
18%
17.5%
18.2%
9.1%
0
22
3
8
2
0
3
Political
organization
14.1%
4.9%
20.0%
9.1%
0
37.5%
12
9
1
3
0
0
Violence
7.7%
14.8%
2.5%
13.5%
0
0
17
10
8
6
4
1
Polarization
10.9%
16.4%
20.0%
27.3%
36.4%
12.5%
17
8
2
3
1
1
Anti-revolution
10.9%
13.1%
5.0%
13.6%
9.1%
12.5%
11
6
4
1
2
0
Reconciliation
7.1%
9.8%
10.0%
4.5%
18.2%
0
13
2
1
0
0
0
Hypocrisy
8.3%
3.3%
2.5%
0
0
0
6
7
1
1
0
1
Anti-modernity
3.8%
11.5%
2.5%
4.5%
0
12.5%
8
1
7
1
1
2
Internal conflict
5.1%
1.6%
17.5
4.5%
9.1%
25%
Conspiracy/trea
7
1
0
1
1
0
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son
Victims of
Mubarak, and
state security
Total

4.5%
2
1.3%

1.6%
3
4.9%

0%
1
2.5%

4.5%
0
0

9.1%
1
9.1%

0
0
0

156

61

40

22

11

8

Figure 8
Framing differences between the MB and Al-Noor
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VI.

DISCUSSION

This study examined the content of four Egyptian daily newspapers to find out
how they framed Islamic movements in the two years following the January 25th
revolution, and if framing differed across newspapers ownership types, degrees of media
professionalism, time periods of change in Islamists political role, or across Islamic
groups. This chapter summarizes the main findings of the study, and compares them to
previous research.
The three top topics in which Islamists were more covered included a level of
conflict or competition; protests, elections and referendums, and violence. The sampled
private Egyptian newspapers used personal photos in more than half of the articles on
Islamists, suggesting a possible personalization of issues/events. The state-owned AlAhram was the only exception where photos of protests were published with articles on
Islamist more than three other papers.
Not surprisingly, the Muslim Brotherhood and their Freedom and Justice Party
were the most mentioned Islamic group, since they won in all elections and referendums
held after the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ tended to mention
Islamists in general or the Salafis in general without specifying which party or movement
they are referring to. This leads to generalization to all Islamists without taking into
account the variety and even the discrepancy among their positions.
One of the most significant devices in framing was the labels used to refer to
Islamists. Although all four newspapers referred to Islamists mainly with their official
names (65.5%), general reference to ―the Islamists‖ and the ―Salafis‖ appeared in almost
106

fifth of the sample. Al-Ahram was more likely to use the official name while Al-Youm
Al-Sabae‘ came first in using ―the Salafis‖ and Al-Masry Al-Youm came first in using
―the Islamists‖. Al-Dostor was far more likely than the other papers to use labels
implying negative impressions especially the anti-democracy theme.
The sampled private newspapers tended to use vague terms when referring to
opponents of Islamists. Only 41% of the total sample defined them with their official
political name or affiliation, and most of these were in the state-owned Al-Ahram.
Moreover, the three private newspapers were more likely to use generalized labels
that are plausible or neutral when referring to opponent of Islamists, while labels with
negative implications were nearly absent. Among the favorable labels, opponents of
Islamists were referred to as ―revolutionary groups, and youth movements‖, ―civil
forces‖, and ―national forces‖ in around fifth of the sample combined (18.4%), slightly
more than neutral labels like ―political forces‖, and ―protesters‖ (12.4%). Political
orientation of Islamists‘ opponents (the one that is strongly emphasized when referring to
Islamists) was only mentioned in two of Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ articles (1.5%) where they
were referred to as Leftists or Liberals. In addition, the state-owned Al-Ahram had fifth
of its articles referring to Islamists‘ rivals using the general term of ―political forces‖.
This tendency imply that the variety of political forces in the Egyptian society oppose
Islamists, which may have helped increase the perceived polarization.
Furthermore, religious identities or orientations like Coptic and Sufi were
sometimes emphasized when speaking of Islamists‘ rivals especially in Al-Youm AlSabea‘. The same with broad professional categories like experts, lawyers and workers in
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the case of Al-Dostor which used them to introduce anti-Islamists while disregarding
their political orientations. This may have further fueled polarization by adding sectarian
and societal dimensions to the political divide.
The private newspapers, especially Al-Dostor and Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘, and to a
less extent Al-Masry Al-Youm, emphasized the Islamist political orientation whenever an
Islamist is mentioned even if he/she is approached as a professional or an expert. But they
mostly refrained from treating opponents of Islamists in the same way. While frequently
referring to Islamists as ―the Islamic forces‖ and ―the Salafis‖ or as ―the Salafi‖ Al-Noor
Party or ―the MB-affiliated‖ Lawyer (Ikhwany), no such stress was found when
opponents of Islamists were mentioned; there were no ―the Secular forces‖, ―the Secular‖
Free Egyptians party, or ―the Socialist‖ lawyer. This distinctive discourse draws a picture
of reality on which Islamists are excluded from the mainstream society.
On the contrary, when approaching Islamists professionally in the state-owned AlAhram they were more likely referred to with their official professional titles like the
President, the governor and so on. This might be the reason behind the small percentage
of Al-Ahram articles that fell under the study sample.
With the exception of Al-Dostor, the sampled Egyptian newspapers quoted both
Islamist and anti-Islamist sources in stories on Islamists with the former slightly more
than the latter. Providing the two opposite views could be regarded as an attempt to
achieve objectivity. But for Al-Dostor, Islamist sources were overshadowed. Al-Dostor
cited anti-Islamist sources far more than the originally-covered Islamists (52% to 32%).
In all four newspapers neutral sources were the least cited, but Al-Masry Al-Youm was
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far more likely than other papers in quoting or paraphrasing neutral sources adding more
variety to its coverage. Al-Ahram and Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ seems to have reduced views
on Islamists to pro and anti-camps, voices in the middle ground that didn‘t fit in the
classification were ignored, further magnifying polarization.
Overall, the most negatively covered Islamic movements were Abu Ismail
supporters, Islamic movements in general (when they were mentioned without
specifications), and the Muslim Brotherhood or its Freedom and Justice party.
The MB/FJP was covered negatively in more than half of the articles (55.8%), the
rest were neutral with only 3% viewing them positively. Certain newspapers had clear
directions toward the MB/FJP, which was primarily negative in Al-Dostor, and neutral in
Al-Ahram. The mostly neutral coverage tone in Al-Ahram might be a result of the
appointment of an Information Minister from the Brotherhood during Morsi‘s term in
office which may have influenced Al-Ahram to be less negative in its coverage of them,
although some observers highlighted that state media didn‘t act as mouthpieces of
government under Morsi the same way they did with his predecessors (Kirkpatrick & ElSheikh, 2012; AP, July 12, 2013). In the case of Al-Masry Al-Youm and despite that the
dominant direction in covering the MB was negative; it presented them positively in three
of its articles. This trend was also observed when covering some other Islamic
movements, suggesting that Al-Masry Al-Youm tries sometimes to provide exceptions to
its dominant coverage tone.
Surprisingly, the Salafi Call and its Al-Noor Party, the second major Islamic force
in Egypt after the Brotherhood according to elections results, was covered neutrally in
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almost two thirds of the sample, although this group is frequently seen as ‗ultraconservative‘ when compared to the Brotherhood. This disparity in coverage might be
interpreted as a result of the difference in political positions between the two parties
especially right before President Morsi was deposed, but the study time frame ended up at
the beginning of February 2013, a time were Al-Noor was a strong supportive of the
Brotherhood positions and was still present in the presidential team. This result needs
further investigation to find the reasons behind the disparity. But it is also worth
mentioning that the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party was never covered positively.
Dominant coverage tone varied also between other Islamic groups. While
Islamists in general or Abu Ismail supporters were covered negatively more than
neutrally, minor Salafi parties and Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya were covered neutrally more
than negatively. Al-Wasat was different, covered mostly neutral then positive.
Results suggest that when the general Islamism of political players was
emphasized, they tend to be covered more negatively than neutrally. This might end up
associating the political orientation of Islamists with negative impressions. This is similar
-- to an extent -- to the practices of Western media when covering Muslims as indicated
in previous research. They tended to emphasize the religious identity of Muslims
whenever they are linked with negative actions like violence.
Frames associated with negative implications were more dominant in covering
Islamists in the four sampled newspapers, while analytical frames which can be of
neutral, positive or negative judgments were less observed. Islamic movements and
parties were mainly framed using the ―anti-democracy‖, ―political organization‖,
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―violence‖, ―polarization‖, and ―anti-revolution‖ frames which constitute together 67.6%
of the sample. The political organization was the only neutral frame that appeared in the
top five frames used with Islamists.
Islamists were framed as ―anti-democracy‖ in around fourth of the sample
(23.4%) emphasizing that they seek to grab authority, consolidate their power, exclude
and oppress others including other political forces, the judiciary, and the people.
Brotherhoodization of the state theme was included under this frame. Islamists were also
frequently framed as ―violent‖ (11.2%) threatening people and engaging in clashes, as
―anti-revolution‖ (9.6%) who sabotaged the January 25th revolution, allied with its
opponents, deceived revolutionaries, and wasted the revolution‘s gains, as ―hypocrites‖
(7.1%) deceiving people with religious symbols while being morally corrupt, and as
―anti-modernity‖ (6.1%) in their thinking and lifestyle, opposing arts and literature and
threatening Egypt‘s identity and national unity. They were also framed, but less
frequently as engaged in ―internal conflict‖ either within their parties and movements or
with fellow Islamists (5.6%), and as ―conspirators‖ (3.6%) cooperating with outside
parties against Egypt‘s interests.
Analytical frames were less likely to be used, such as ―politically organized‖
which highlighted Islamists‘ organizational capabilities and political outreach (13.2%).
The ―polarization‖ frame (10.2%) viewed political events as rounds of conflict between
Islamists and the rest of the political forces, and sometimes the society, referring to two
sides (pro and anti) and emphasizing winners and losers. It treated each camp as a
hegemonic group overlooking differences, focusing on extreme opinions and
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overshadowing voices in the middle. An opposite ―reconciliation‖ frame that implied
multiple sides and asserted co-operation, compromise and unity on national issues was
used in 7.6% of the articles. Islamists were rarely framed as victims of Mubarak regime
and its state security apparatus.
A significant difference was found between newspaper ownership types and the
frames used in covering Islamists. The state-owned newspaper used analytical frames
more than private newspapers. The ―political organization‖, ―polarization‖ and ―internal
conflict‖ frames appeared in the state-owned Al-Ahram almost double the percentage in
private newspapers for the same frames. On the contrary, private newspapers were far
more likely to use the violence frame. Some frames were exclusively used by private
newspapers including the anti-revolution, conspiracy, anti-modernity, and hypocrisy. But
both types of newspapers ownership employed the anti-democracy frame similarly.
Frames that strongly feature anti-Islamist discourse were significantly used by
newspapers that scored lower in professional and ethical standards scale as categorized by
the Supreme Press Council in Egypt (Hamada, Al-Ghaly, Al-Azrak, & Fikry, 2013). The
newspapers with the least violations, Al-Ahram, used frames that are more analytical than
judgmental. The newspaper with minimum violations, Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘ used both
types but frames carrying a negative judgment were more used. The newspaper classified
as moderate in its violations, Al-Masry Al-Youm, used the anti-democracy and antirevolution frames double the times it used analytical frames like the political organization
or reconciliation. The highest newspaper in violating professional and ethical standards,
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Al-Dostor, employed anti-Islamists frames far more than other newspapers especially the
anti-democracy, violence and hypocrisy frames.
Different Islamic groups were framed differently. While the MB/FJP was
primarily framed as anti-democracy, politically organized and anti-revolution, the Salafi
Call/Al-Noor was more framed through the analytical frames of political organization,
polarization, reconciliation and internal conflict. The MB/FJP was far more framed as
anti-democracy and anti-revolution than the Salafi Call/Al-Noor party. The latter result is
problematic since the Brotherhood participated in the January 25th revolution while the
Salafi Call‘s prominent leader Sheikh Yasser Borhami issued a fatwa at that time
prohibiting participation in demonstrations. Conspiracy frame was never used with the
Salafi Call/Al-Noor while used in 4.5% of the articles on MB. Also hypocrisy and
violence were used with MB more than the Salafi Call/Al-Noor.
Results align with previous studies that found that frames develop with events.
When the political roles of Islamists changed, framing became more negative in tone and
increased in volume. As opposition, Islamists were framed as politically organized,
violent, and anti-modernity. After gaining parliamentary majority, two other frames
appeared powerfully: reconciliation and anti-revolution. After winning the Presidency,
anti-democracy was the most salient frame, in addition to hypocrisy and violence.
President Morsi‘s constitutional decree, regarded by anti-Islamists as the main reason for
opposing him, was not a significant point of change in framing Islamic movements.
Dominant frames remained the same: anti-democracy, violence, anti-revolution and
polarization, but only increased in volume.
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The results of the study are consistent with the findings of prior scholarship that
analyzed media representation of Islamists which found strong similarities between the
ways in which media in Muslim countries framed Islamists and Western media
representation of Muslims. The prevailing frames in Western media coverage of Muslims
included terrorism/violence, anti-modernity, anti-democracy, and victimization of
Muslim women. Western media also ignored diversity among Muslims or used a
dichotomous two-sided internal conflict frame. These were the same in Egyptian cinema
representation of Islamists, which also framed them as corrupt and hypocritical, as
victims of authorities, and conspirators. In both cases, the Orientalist discourse was used
to frame Muslims or Islamists as the ―Other‖. The dominant frames revealed in this study
are similar except for the victimization of women, implying – at least to some extent -the same exclusionary Orientalist view towards Islamists.
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VII.

CONCLUSION

This chapter includes the conclusions of the study, its limitations, ideas for future
research, and recommendations for fair representation.
The study reached four main conclusions. First, that there is a framing bias against
Islamists in Egyptian newspapers coverage. Anti-Islamists frames dominated most of
Egyptian newspaper coverage of Islamists, while counter frames representing Islamists
views -- such as being pro-revolution – were largely excluded from the debate.
Part of the negative framing of Islamists can be attributed to the fact that they
were in power – and thus subject to more scrutiny – and also because they committed
what was perceived a political mistakes during the transition period. However, the fact
that framing was overwhelmingly negative in tone, consistent through time – and differed
to some extent by newspaper type – suggests that it was, to a significant extent,
ideologically driven. The coverage must also be seen in the light of what some scholars
and analysts have characterized as a campaign to undermine the Muslim Brotherhood,
particularly after the start of Mohamed Morsi‘s term in office (Esposito, 2013; Elmasry,
2013; Howaidy, 2013a, Al-Majid, 2012). The drivers of the campaign were often
opposition figures frequently sourced in news articles, and sometimes media figures
themselves (Elmasry, 2013).
The second conclusion is that framing devices employed by Egyptian newspapers
in covering Islamic groups reveal that framing may have contributed to the polarization
of the Egyptian society. By using general labels that carry a value-judgment when
referring to Islamists and their opponents, a distorted simplified picture of Islamists vs.
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the rest of the political forces or the whole society is perceived. But the Egyptian reality
is far complex. Most of the general labels used, like political forces or revolutionaries for
example, included on the ground Islamic, anti-Islamic and also non-Islamic attitudes in
the same label.
The third conclusion stems from the similarities between the results and the
previously documented anti-Islamists frames in Egyptian media produced under Mubarak
regime. This suggests that one of the main influences on Egyptian newspaper framing of
Islamists in post-revolution Egypt is still Mubarak regime‘s framing of them. Further
pointing out that Mubarak regime could still be the one who is reaching out to the media,
and thus to more political power (Entman, 2007) Further research using more in-depth
methods such as discourse analysis should clearly investigate such observation.
Fourth, the similarities between framing Islamists in Egyptian newspapers and
framing Muslims in Western media as highlighted by previous research also suggest a
similar potential framing effect. In Western contexts, Islamophobia was found to be the
main consequence, as exemplified in three main effects: more hostility and fear of the
excluded group, more public support to government actions against the excluded group,
and increasing feelings among the excluded group of exclusion and discrimination. Due
to the resemblance in framing, similar effects might be witnessed whether on policy,
public attitudes, or Islamists themselves, suggesting an Islamistophobia in this case. But
this an issue that would need further research by scholars.
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Limitations
The results of this study are limited to the type of content analyzed, the
newspapers sampled and the time period specified. Results are not generalizable beyond
these boundaries. The study analyzed news articles only, and since some previous studies
highlighted differences between news and commentary in the frames they propagated,
results cannot be generalized to opinion content. It is also limited to the time period that
ended on February 2013. After the July 3, 2013 media landscape and discourse changed
dramatically. The study is also limited to describing the content of newspapers; any
arguments on the effects of such content need further examination by other relevant
research methods.
Future Research
Future research should address how the framing of Islamic movements changed
after the deposition of President Morsi in July 3, 2013. This is important in light of the
several violations and attacks on press freedoms that took place afterwards, and the
observed surge in anti-Islamist discourse that dominated the Egyptian media, painting
Islamic movements as terrorists and attempting to justify the crackdown on them
(Nordland, 2013) .
It is also important to compare framing of Egyptian Islamic movements between
Egyptian and international media, especially after the increasing criticism from the
military-backed government and some analysts (see Fishere, 2013) of the ‗biased‘
international media coverage of ongoing events in Egypt. It might also be useful to
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compare newspapers framing with the framing of other media types like TV, since some
studies have pointed out to some framing variations between different media types.
Further research should clearly find out why journalists frame Islamic movements
in this way by utilizing the appropriate qualitative methods along with surveys and
experiments. Based on Entman model (2007), reasons for bias might include perceived
facts, events‘ context, public relations skills of supporters and opponents of an issue,
unintended decision biases arising from market competition or the evaluation of the
political game, or intended decision biases influenced by personal ideology. The
consequences of bias might be fatal for society. Thus, accurately identifying reasons for
framing bias enables the media to realize and perhaps reduce it, and audience members to
become more aware of it.
Another area which needs further research is the effects of such negative framing.
Framing effects are not inevitable, but are the results of the interaction between audience
frames and media frames. Studies need to find out how the Egyptian audience perceives
Islamic movements, and what relation this might have with the media framing of them.
Recommendations
If objectivity is to provide opposite positions within the same frame, fairness is to
allow competing frames to appear equally over periods of time, or to employ judgmentfree frames. As indicated by previous studies, the perceived dominance and the potential
effects of frames increase when they are not challenged and, thus they become
standardized. Academics and media regulators should find effective ways to encourage
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and guarantee fairness in media framing of different political actors, as one of the means
to achieve reconciliation. Suggested ideas may include:


The incorporation of news ombudsmen in Egyptian newspapers



Increasing the scale and the effectiveness of public monitoring on the media.



Providing incentives -- like awards and tax relief -- to journalists and newspapers
that are more committed to diversity in their framing.



Providing transparency of private newspapers ownership so that audience
members become aware of the political orientation that might affect the editorial
policy.
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APPENDIX A: CONTENT ANALYSIS CODING SCHEME
(Adapted from Entman, 2006; Entman, 2010; Elmasry, 2011; Ibrahim, 2012; Allagui &
Najjar, 2011; Mishra, 2008; Khan & Govindasamy, 2011; Kerr & Moy, 2002)




Analyze first page articles which refer to Islamists in general, MB/FJP, Al-Nour/the
Salafi Call, in the headline, sub-headlines, the three first paragraphs, the photo or the
photo caption
Analyze articles referring to Morsi or the government only if correlated with any
reference to Islamists
In case of Al-Dostor take the first page (not the cover) but the 3rd page in counting.
Article ID#: (number your articles)

1. Article Date: (day/month/year)
Year one: Feb 12, 2011 – Feb, 12, 2012
1. Thursday, 31 March 2011
2. Friday, 1 April 2011
3. Wednesday, 13 April 2011
4. Tuesday, 19 April 2011
5. Wednesday, 18 May 2011
6. Tuesday, 14 June 2011
7. Thursday, 30 June 2011
8. Monday, 4 July 2011
9. Sunday, 9 October 2011
10. Sunday, 30 October 2011
11. Monday, 12 September 2011
12. Friday, 23 December 2011
13. Saturday, 7 January 2012
14. Saturday, 28 January 2012
Year two Feb, 12, 2012 – Feb 12, 2013
15. Saturday, 25 February 2012
16. Wednesday, 11 April 2012
17. Friday, 4 May 2012
18. Friday, 22 June 2012
19. Monday, 2 July 2012
20. Saturday, 28 July 2012
21. Tuesday, 28 August 2012
22. Thursday, 4 October 2012
23. Sunday, 4 November 2012
24. Thursday, 15 November 2012
25. Tuesday, 27 November 2012
26. Wednesday, 28 November 2012
27. Sunday, 27 January 2013
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28. Monday, 4 February 2013
2. Newspaper:
1. Al-Ahram
2. Al-Masry Al-Youm
3. Al-Youm Al-Sabea‘
4. Al-Dostor
3. Topic (decide from the headline, sub-head and the lead)
1. Presidency decisions/declarations/actions
2. Government decisions/actions
3. Elections /Referendums/polls
4. Constitution, constituent assembly
5. Legislative bodies (People‘s assembly, Shura Council)
6. Protests, sit-ins, strikes, and civil obedience
7. Law/Judicial Bodies (anything involving judiciary bodies, legal
regulations and restrictions, law enforcement)
8. Violence (from: police, military, protestors, sectarian violence)
9. Crime (investigations, lawsuits, trials, corruption, doesn‘t include
terrorism)
10. Human rights abuse (Military trials, torture)
11. Economy/Business
12. Religious affairs (statements of religious figures, religious trends and
ideas)
13. Corruption
14. Culture
15. Foreign relations (statements of foreign officials, US aid, peace treaty)
16. Political meetings, press conferences (excluding those with the president,
the government)
17. Political parties formation, alliances, internal divisions
18. Politicians statements, activities, tweets
19. Terrorism in Sinai
4. Is the Muslim Brotherhood or its FJP mentioned in the news story?
1. Yes
2. No
5. Is the Salafi Call or its Al-Nour party mentioned in the news story?
1. Yes
2. No
6. Are Al-Asala, Al-Fadila, and Al-Watan or the Salafi Front mentioned in the
news story?
1. Yes
2. No
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7. Is Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya or its Al-Binaa w Al-Tanmia party mentioned in the
news story?
1. Yes
2. No
8. Is Abu Ismail supporters, his Al-Raya Party or Al-Ummah Coalition mentioned
in the news story?
1. Yes
2. No
9. Is Al-Wasat Party mentioned in the news story?
1. Yes
2. No
10. Is Al-Haya al-Shariyya lil-Haquq wa-l Islah (Islamic Legitimate Body of Rights
and Reformation) mentioned in the news story?
1. Yes
2. No
11. Are Islamists or the Salafis in general (as a plural with no specifications)
mentioned in the news story (count it here if mentioned solely or with any of the
above names)?
1. Yes
2. No
12. What is the content of the photo accompanying the news story (If there is more
than one photo, select the largest, if they are the same size, select the right/top
one)?
1. Personal
2. Political meetings, press conferences (excluding those with the
government, president)
3. Protest, sit-ins, and funerals of martyrs
4. Sit-in, strike
5. Violence (from police/military, from protestors)
6. Legislative bodies (People‘s assembly, Shura Council)
7. Government/president meeting/speeches
8. Logos/sings only
9. No photo
10. Elections or referendums
11. Army vehicles, or soldiers
12. Tunnel
13. Previous issues of the newspaper
14. Mosques, rituals and shrines
15. Court
16. Cleaning campaigns
137

17. Graph
13. How does the news story refer to Islamists (in case of more than one lablel, take
the one that occurred first in the head, sub-head, lead)?
1. Islamists,
Islamic
Trends/forces/organization/movements/groups,
Religious Trends/forces
2. Militia/s, Militants, Terrorist/s, Islamic Thugs
3. Cell/s, Network/s
4. With their official name: e.g. The Salafi Call, The MB
5. MB youth/Salafi Youth
6. Bearded men, facially veiled women
7. The Outlawed, the ex-terrorists
8. Sheiks
9. The Hired
10. Other: please specify ….
14. How does the news story refer to Islamists’ opponents (if it did)?
1. Civil Trends, forces
2. Revolutionary groups/forces, Youth, Youth movements
3. The People, Citizen/Citizens, popular committees, residents
4. Political forces, the parties, politicians, or activists
5. National forces , patriotic forces
6. Not mentioned
7. With their official names
8. Protestors
9. Workers
10. Other: please specify ….
15. Are Islamist sources quoted or paraphrased?
1. Yes
2. No
16. Are non-Islamist neutral sources quoted or paraphrased? (Include government
officials here if they are technocrats not politicians, citizens, and eyewitnesses. If
a source is not clearly anti-Islamists or Islamist, put him here. Put presidency
here if referred to generally, and Morsi if not called (MB’s Morsi or something
similar)
1. Yes
2. No
17. Are anti-Islamist sources quoted or paraphrased?
1. Yes
2. No
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18. What is the news story direction towards Islamists mentioned in it (your first
impression basically from head, sub-head, lead..)?
Subject
Positive 1 Neutral 2 Negative 3 Not
mentioned 4
19. MB/FJP
19. The Salafi Call/Al-Nour
20. Al-Asala, Al-Fadila, AlWatan Parties, or the Salafi
Front
21. Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya
or Al-Bena‘ w Al-Tanmia
22. Abu Ismail supporters/AlRaya Party
23. Al-Wasat
24. Al-Haya al-Shariyya lilHaquq wa-l Islah
25. Islamists or Salafis in
general (as a plural with no
specifications)
26. What is the news story dominant frame of Islamists? (the one that is heavily
supported through the most salient elements - head, sub-heads, lead, photo, pull
quotes - and more likely to occur in readers minds. Below each frame is the main
points that should be emphasized in it)
1. Violence Frame:
- Expressing anger and promising revenge.
- Killing and injuring
- Engaging in clashes
- Destruction, burning and damage
- Angry hostile slogans
- Threatening people
- Using war terminology
- Defend terrorists
2. Anti-revolution, the antagonist
- Sabotaged the revolution
- Had secret deals with Mubarak regime, its remnants or SCAF
- Deceived revolutionaries
- Wasted revolutionary gains
3. Conspiracy/treason
- having hidden agendas
- depending on unknown/external sources of ﬁnance
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-

having secret ties with foreign parties (including countries like Qatar,
Hamas, US, Saudi Arabia, Gulf Countries)
having outside roots, or affiliated with an international network

4. Anti-modernity/threat to Egyptian culture/backwardness frame
- medieval in their lifestyle and thinking,
- vulgar and intolerant fanatics
- against culture, arts and literature
- Threat to Egyptian culture and identity
- Reason behind sectarian clashes, threat to national unity
- Need to be modernized
- Blindly obey their leaders
- primitive, simple-minded, ignorant, easily deceived
5. Internal Conflict
- Old guards and new guards
- Youth rebelling against leaders
- Denial/condemnation of another Islamist position
- Parties internal division and splits
- Disagreement among different Islamists
6. Hypocrisy (nonreligious – using religion to reach power)
- Deceive people by religious symbols
- Corrupt (financially, administratively, or morally)
- Exploit people needs (election bribers)
- Accept un-Islamic deeds (like IMF loan, licensing cabaret)
- Don‘t apply Shari‘ah
- Liars
- Against Al-Azhar
7. Anti-democracy
- Power seekers, and interest-driven
- threaten civil state, or advocate a theological state
- force views on others
- Dictators
- Assault judiciary/ judiciary independence
- Rush up with the constitution
- Oppress their opponents
- Brotherhoodization of the state
8. Politically organized
- Plan for elections early
- Well-organized (in a positive or neutral manner)
- Lobby for their demands
- Reach out to influential people
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-

Engage in political coalitions

9. Polarization Frame
- Egypt is divided to conflicting pro and anti camps
- Protest and counter protests
10. Reconciliation Frame
- Multiples forces
- avoiding clash
- Condemning wrong acts (like violence)
- United in national and issues
11. Victims of Mubarak regime and his state security apparatus
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APPENDIX B: INTERCODER RELIABILITY
N cases:
29
N variables:
27
N coders per variable: 2
#

Variable Name

%
Agreement

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Scott's Pi

Krippendorff's
Alpha
(nominal)
1
1
1
1
0.958
0.959
1
1
0.93
0.931
0.653
0.659
1
1
1
1
undefined*
undefined*
1
1
undefined*
undefined*
0.812
0.815
1
1
0.874
0.876
0.862
0.865
0.776
0.78
0.73
0.735
0.931
0.932
0.947
0.948
0.873
0.875
1
1
1
1

Date
100%
Newspaper
100%
Topic
96.6%
MB mentioned
100%
Al-Noor mentioned
96.6%
Other Salafi mentioned
96.6%
Al-Gama‘a Al-Islamiyya mentioned
100%
Abu Ismail mentioned
100%
Al-Wasat mentioned
100%
Abu ElFotouh mentioned
100%
Al-Hay‘a Al-Shariyya mentioned
100%
Islamists in general mentioned
93.1%
Photo Content
100%
Reference to Islamists
96.6%
Reference to opponents
89.7%
Islamists sourced
89.7%
Neutral sourced
89.7%
Anti-Islamists sourced
96.6%
Direction to MB
96.6%
Direction to Al-Noor
93.1%
Direction to other Salafi
100%
Direction to Al-Gama‘a Al100%
Islamiyya
23 Direction to Abu Ismail
100%
1
1
24 Direction to Al-Wasat
100%
undefined*
undefined*
25 Direction to Abu El-Fotouh
100%
1
1
26 Direction to Al-Hay‘a Al-Shariyya
100%
undefined*
undefined*
27 Dominant Frame
82.8%
0.79
0.793
*Scott's pi, Cohen's kappa, and Krippendorff's Alpha are undefined for this variable due
to invariant values.

142

